3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
662.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary advised Sir David Manning
on
20 February
that the “chances of a successful inspection are increasingly
slim”.182
SIS had
sent messages to its best placed sources “emphasising the utmost
importance
of a major
find in the next two weeks, and asking them to do everything
possible to
try and
identify where materials or papers being hidden”. The chances of a
potential
defector
were “not encouraging”.
663.
An internal
FCO minute of the Iraq morning meeting on 20 February recorded
that
the UK was
“now moving away from the idea of benchmarks from Dr Blix,
given US
concerns …
and the difficulty of coming up with anything specific
enough”.183
664.
The FCO
instructions for Dr Bryan Wells, MOD Director
Counter-Proliferation and
Arms
Control and UK representative on the UNMOVIC College of
Commissioners, for
the
discussion of the “clusters document”, stated that it was important
that he did:
“… nothing
which suggests the UK endorses the document, or even
accepts
the
validity of proceeding with work against the SCR 1284 timetable in
present
circumstances.
That is not to say that we regard … 1284 as invalid. But it must
now
be viewed
in the light of SCR 1441, which requires Iraq to co-operate
‘immediately,
unconditionally
and actively’ with the inspectors. We see no point in proceeding
with
work
mandated by … 1284 so long as such co-operation is
lacking.”184
665.
The FCO added:
“We realise that this will not be an easy line to take. It may in
the
event be
best simply to say that the paper appears irrelevant in present
circumstances
of Iraqi
non-co-operation, and then decline to engage on the
substance.”
666.
The FCO also
wrote that it realised the position might “annoy” Dr Blix, and
UKMIS
New York
was asked to forewarn him of the UK’s likely approach, and
to:
“… explain
our concern that the … document may be exploited by some
countries
as an
excuse to postpone a further decision on the fundamental issue of
Iraqi
co‑operation
… thereby undermining the pressure on Baghdad.”
667.
The letter
showed that the initial view of officials had been that the
document
“could be
played into the long grass” as “no more than an internal piece of
UNMOVIC
work-in-progress”;
and that “As such there should be no question of it being
presented
to the
Security Council.” But there were suggestions that others might
present it “as a
set of
benchmarks” which could be used to “focus the Council’s attention
on the middle
distance –
well past the mid-March date we and the US are looking at for a
decision”.
182
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: UNMOVIC Inspections and
Defectors’.
183
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
184
Letter
Dowse to Wells, 20 February 2003, ‘UNMOVIC Commissioners’ Meeting:
“Clusters Document’’’.
297