6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

survey’ to identify candidates and persuade them to shorten the time it will take them

to deploy.”174

534. Possible levels of UK commitment to Phase IV were set out in an annex:

“i. Maximum payoff (and maximum cost): Tackle a problem area (eg Basra) with

a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming a multinational HQ). A UK Brigade

in the SE sector. HQ ARRC taking on the CJTF(I) role early for six months. UK

involvement (but not military) in a reconstruction pillar. This would be contingent

on US burden sharing …

ii. Regional (+): The SE Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming

a multinational HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector. No HQ ARRC but UK

involvement (including military) in a reconstruction pillar and a significant staff

contribution to CJTF-I.

iii. Regional: The SE Sector with a UK two-star lead (subsequently becoming

a multinational HQ). A UK Brigade in the SE sector.

iv. Regional (-): A UK Brigade in the SE sector – not UK led. UK involvement

(including military) in a reconstruction pillar.

v. Regional (- -): A UK Brigade in the SE sector – not UK led.”

535. Mirroring the urgency expressed in the IPU Annotated Agenda, the MOD warned

that, in the absence of settled UK policy on the scale or duration of the UK contribution

to post-conflict Iraq, that contribution risked being determined “by decisions being taken

by CENTCOM now”.

536. The MOD identified a number of specific concerns, including:

• US plans envisaged the UK having responsibility for security in one of seven

sectors. The UK had neither agreed formally nor challenged the US assumption.

Nor had other departments scoped what non-military UK contributions could be

sustained. The UK was “currently at risk of taking on an unsustainable task if

there is no further Coalition contribution to the occupation of Iraq”.

• If the UK did lead a military sector, there was a risk of the UK military being

“intimately involved” in the civil administration, “not a role they would seek”.

There was “a pressing need to identify civil capacity across the international civil

admin effort, including to support civil administration in a UK military sector”.

• The UK was “carrying some risk of early humanitarian assistance failures in the

UK AO”.

174 Minute Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath – Medium to Long

Term UK Military Commitment’.

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