The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
covered by
the two NFZs.73
This was to
be in the form of a joint FCO/MOD response
“agreed, as
appropriate, with the Assessments Staff”.
125.
On 12 January
2001, in response to the November 2000 commission to look
at
military
alternatives to the NFZ (described earlier in this Section), Mr
Webb wrote to
Mr McKane
advising that:
•
The
elimination of Saddam Hussein’s WMD capabilities could not be
achieved
without
inspections. Air power alone would not be sufficient.
•
There might
be scope for adjusting the northern NFZ, to limit patrolling to
the
Kurdish
Autonomous Zone only or to rely on patrolling within Turkish air
space.
•
The picture
was “rather different” in the South. The southern NFZ
remained
justified
on humanitarian grounds. More importantly, it was essential to the
UK’s
objective
of preventing Saddam Hussein from endangering regional stability
by
threatening
his southern neighbours.74
126.
On 17 January,
Mr McKane chaired a meeting to discuss Iraq.75
Officials
agreed
that the
MOD should look at “possible options” for the southern NFZ with the
US,
including
reduced coalition patrols and responses and reliance on some form
of “active
deterrence”.
Officials also noted that Lord Williams was reviewing the legal
justification
for the
NFZs.
127.
Officials
agreed that it would be necessary to draw together for Ministers
the
various
threads relating to Iraq, after progress had been made in
discussions with
the US. A
further meeting was envisaged in “a month or so, subject to
developments”.
128.
On 29 January,
Mr Patey responded to the Attorney General’s request
of
21 December
2000 for further information relating to the NFZs.76
Mr Patey
advised that
the letter
had been agreed with the MOD and the Cabinet Office.
“Both the
UK and US have made it clear to Iraq and publicly that we will take
military
action if
Iraq moves to reconstitute its WMD capability or threaten its
neighbours.
The US has
in addition stated that they would take action if Iraq moved to
attack the
Kurds.
While we have not made the same explicit commitment, any Iraqi
attack on
the Kurdish
area … would be very difficult for the British Government to
ignore. Our
interests …
are likely to argue strongly in favour of a response. This would
however
depend to a
large extent on the circumstances …”
73
Letter
Berman to Patey, 21 December 2000, ‘Iraq: No Fly
Zones’.
74
Letter Webb
to McKane, 11 January 2001, ‘Iraq: Future Military Options’
attaching Paper MOD,
11 January
2001, ‘Containing Iraq: Future Military Options’.
75
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 17 January 2001, ‘Iraq’; Brummell to McKane, 22
January 2001, ‘Iraq’.
76
Letter
Patey to Berman, 29 January 2001, ‘Iraq: No-Fly
Zones’.
214