The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
263.
Lt Gen Reith’s
recommendations were discussed by the Chiefs of Staff on 30
July.
The minutes
of that meeting record that:
“CJO [Chief
of Joint Operations] had discussed the Review with GOC
MND(SE)
who was
content that the adjustment to force levels would be adequate.
CDS
[Chief of
the Defence Staff] invited CJO to investigate the merit in
deploying the
SLE
[Spearhead Land Element] to Cyprus to acclimatise in order that
they might be
better
prepared were they called upon for deployment to Iraq. COS [Chiefs
of Staff]
agreed to
CJO’s recommendations, and CDS directed DG Op Pol [Director
General
Operational
Policy] to submit to Ministers.”132
264.
On 30 July,
Sir Hilary Synnott took up post as the Head of CPA(South).
His
appointment
is described in Section 10.1.
265.
Mr David
Richmond succeeded Mr Sawers as the Prime Minister’s
Special
Representative
for Iraq on an interim basis at the end of July 2003, and remained
in
post until
Sir Jeremy Greenstock arrived in September. Mr Richmond
remained as
Sir Jeremy’s
Deputy until Sir Jeremy left at the end of March
2004.133
266.
Asked about
his key responsibilities, Sir David Richmond told the
Inquiry:
“The first
was really a thirst for information about what was going on. They
wanted
me to
establish a good working relationship with Bremer and to find out
as much as
I could
about what was going on and ensure that London were kept fully
informed …
“[the
second] to ensure they [British secondees] fitted into the
organisation, that they
[were] able
to operate effectively and look after their safekeeping and well
being,
which
became an increasing burden as time went on.
“… [the
third] to try to ensure an orderly transition to a … sovereign
representative
Iraqi
government and associated with that was obviously trying to hand
over to them
in the best
possible condition, which meant the whole range of issues that the
CPA
267.
Sir David
considered that:
“… the area
where we [Greenstock, Sawers and Richmond] could make
the
greatest contribution
as representatives was to the political process. This is
because
as
diplomats that’s the sort of thing we know or are expected to
know
268.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by telephone on 31 July.136
132
Minutes, 30
July 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
133
Telegram
109 IraqRep to FCO, 26 March 2004, ‘Iraq Valedictory: Six Months in
the Cauldron’.
134
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 3-4.
135
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 6.
136
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 31 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 31 July’.
250