The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
militia
influence within the Basra ISF. Maj Gen Binns commented: “Not a
ringing
endorsement,
but a positive step and an endorsement we’ve been trying to
achieve
since
April this year.”
492.
On the
afternoon of 8 October, Mr Brown told the House of Commons
that the UK
expected to
establish PIC in Basra in the next two months and
that:
“As part of
the process of putting the Iraqi forces in the lead in Basra, we
have just
gone
through a demanding operation which involved consolidating our
forces at
Basra
airport. That was successfully completed, as planned, last month.
The next
important
stage in delivering our strategy to hand over security to the
Iraqis is a
move from a
combat role in the rest of Basra province to overwatch, which
will
itself have
two distinct stages. In the first, the British forces that remain
in Iraq will
have the
following tasks: training and mentoring the Iraqi army and police
force;
securing
supply routes and policing the Iran-Iraq border; and the ability to
come to
the
assistance of the Iraqi security forces when called upon. Then in
the spring of
next year –
and guided as always by the advice of our military commanders –
we
plan to
move to a second stage of overwatch where the coalition would
maintain a
more
limited re-intervention capacity and where the main focus will be
on training
and mentoring.
“… after
detailed discussions with our military commanders, a meeting of
the
national
security committee, discussions with the Iraqi Government and our
allies
and,
subject, of course, to conditions on the ground – we plan from next
spring
to reduce
force numbers in southern Iraq to a figure of 2,500 … In both
stages of
overwatch,
around 500 logistics and support personnel will be based outside
Iraq
but
elsewhere in the region. At all times … we will be honouring our
obligations to
the Iraqi
people and their security, and ensuring the safety of our
forces.”236
493.
Mr Brown
also announced a new policy on resettlement support for
locally
employed
staff (see Section 15.1) and emphasised the importance of
economic
reconstruction
“to ensure that ordinary Iraqis have a stake in the
future”.
494.
In the
Parliamentary debate that followed, Mr Brown was asked whether
he was
satisfied
that the Iraqi Security Forces were capable of maintaining the
security of
southern
Iraq without UK support, whether the numbers of troops being
retained was
sufficient
to ensure that the troops could protect themselves adequately and
whether
there was
continuing value in retaining any military presence in
Iraq.237
495.
In response,
Mr Brown explained that he was acting on the advice of his
military
commanders
and that troops were remaining because the Iraqi Government
wanted
236
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8 October
2007, columns 21-25.
237
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8 October
2007, columns 25-37.
274