6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
415.
Mr Annan
briefed members of the UN Security Council on
humanitarian
contingency
planning on 13 February.
416.
Mr Annan
and Ms Louise Fréchette, UN Deputy Secretary-General,
briefed
members of
the Security Council on the UN Secretariat’s humanitarian
contingency
planning
and financial requirements on 13 February.194
417.
Mr Annan
reported that Ms Fréchette had led a steering group of the relevant
UN
departments,
funds and programmes since November 2002 to prepare
contingency
plans in
case of conflict. The task would be complex because of the large
number of
Iraqis
already dependent on international aid through OFF.
418.
Ms Fréchette
explained that the UN agencies had developed an
integrated
humanitarian
plan for Iraq, working with the six neighbouring countries, the
ICRC and
NGOs.
US$30.6m had already been pledged and the UN was preparing a
request
for a
further US$88.8m. Much more would be needed in the event of a
“medium-case
scenario”
of two to three months’ acute conflict, which would trigger a
“flash appeal”.
419.
The US$2.22bn
UN Flash Appeal for Iraq was launched on 28 March (see
Section 10.1).
420.
Mr Straw
raised the Security Council briefing with Mr Annan on 14
February.195
Mr Annan’s
concerns were understandable, but “the US was doing a huge amount
on
this, and
the UK was contributing and planning also. DFID were active, and
keen on UN
cover for
an operation.” Mr Annan stated that all the humanitarian
agencies also wanted
UN cover,
including for the reconstruction effort.
421.
Mr Straw
“pointed out that there was in this area an inverse relationship
between
loudness of
rhetoric and willingness to contribute hard cash”.
422.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN from 1998
to
2003, told
the Inquiry that the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York
(UKMIS
New York)
discussed post-conflict Iraq with the UN Secretariat in February
2003.196
There were
very clear indications the UN did not want the administration of
Iraq to
become its
responsibility. It was more focused on the things it was very good
at:
“… food
supply, some policing perhaps, help for the political process and
other
aspects of
services to a population or territory in trouble but not to take
full
responsibility.”
194
Telegram
257 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: UN
Humanitarian
Contingency
Planning’.
195
Telegram
268 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with the UN
Secretary-General: 14 February’.
196
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 5.
381