The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
strengthened
inspections.178
There was
overwhelming support for two stages “or at least
a continued
central role for the Council” in authorising military action. There
was “an
overwhelming
dislike of unilateral action and strong desire for [a] diplomatic
solution”.
556.
Sir John
Holmes advised that France was likely to stand firm on the need
for
a two stage
approach, which would leave the UK in an uncomfortable
dilemma.
557.
Sir John
Holmes advised that France thought that it was winning the
argument
and did
not think that much would happen until the debate on Iraq in the
Security
Council on
16 October.179
France
“remained convinced of the need for the international
community
to stay united to avoid an explosion of unrest and terrorism”. It
was
concerned
about “the catastrophic consequences of a war on Iraq without clear
proof
of Saddam’s
WMD ambitions and full international, including Arab, support”.
France
would
“nevertheless” be:
“… ready to
support military action if the full cycle of inspections/renewed
(serious)
Iraqi
misbehaviour/international agreement can be gone through, and
have
confirmed
that someone else’s veto of a second resolution would not deter
them if
they were
convinced of the need for action. But they are uncomfortably aware
that
there may …
not be time available for this full cycle to be gone through before
the
presumed
climatic window … for military action closes.”
558.
That led to
two reflections which were “mutually contradictory”: that the
US
was “bent
on war come what may … and are only looking for the UN to endorse
a
casus
belli” or that “even the US are not mad enough to embark on
military action …
without significant
international support”. Both led “the French to think that
they
should stand
firm”.
559.
Sir John
concluded that, if the deadlock was not broken, the UK risked
“being left
in the most
uncomfortable position of all, choosing whether to follow the US
without UN
cover, with
all that entails, domestically and internationally”. He understood
the UK’s
“reluctance
to get squeezed between the Americans and the French”, but
suggested that
Mr Blair
might have a “crucial” role.
560.
The US
tabled compromise language on 16 October intended to bridge
the
difference
between the US and French positions, deliberately creating
ambiguity
by stating
that the Security Council would “consider” reports of a breach,
not
“decide” if
a breach existed.
561.
That
language remained virtually unchanged in the final
resolution.
178
Telegram
1992 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Security
Council Open
Debate: Day
2’.
179
Telegram
597 Paris to FCO London, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: French
Thinking’.
302