9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

than the other way round. What was needed was a new political vision and compact,

reaffirmed by the political leaders in Iraq, with coalition involvement. The key elements

for a new political deal would be:

• the Hydrocarbons Law;

• holding early provincial elections;

• a deal with insurgents, as in Anbar; and

• a new political platform agreed jointly by the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds in

government.

861.  Mr Blair said that the only way to tie Prime Minister Maliki into such a deal would

be to use the leverage provided by his desire that US forces should not leave.

862.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s record of the conversation was sent only to staff in No.10.

It ended: “The Prime Minister did not want this conversation reported widely.” Sir Nigel

therefore suggested that Mr Blair’s Private Secretary reported in his formal record of the

discussion that Mr Blair had followed up with President Bush on 20 May and that further

discussion of the political initiative was expected.

863.  Sir Nigel later added that Mr Blair had promised President Bush a short note on

the elements of his proposed political/reconciliation initiative, which Mr Blair’s Private

Secretary was preparing.469

864.  On 22 May, Mr Blair met Gen Dannatt.470 Mr Blair commented on the impressive

work that UK troops were doing in Iraq and that, in his discussions with the troops, he

had found morale and determination high.

865.  Gen Dannatt observed that the underlying dynamic in Basra was intra‑Shia

competition motivated by financial gain, and “that, although there would remain

an important training and mentoring role in Iraq, there was a robust case for the

redeployment of forces to Afghanistan in the medium term”. Mr Blair agreed that UK

troops should remain in Iraq only so long as there was real utility in their doing so,

though he observed that it was important to be “very careful about potentially leaving,

or appearing to leave, the field open to the Iranians”.

866.  Gen Dannatt agreed it was important to ensure that the British Army came out

of Iraq with its reputation intact, which would require “a perception of strategic success

in the South”.

469  Minute Sheinwald to Banner, 21 May 2007, ‘Iraq: PM/Bush Phone Call, 20 May’.

470  Letter Banner to Forber, 22 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Chief of the General Staff’.

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