The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

the Warren was critical and that “DIA concerns … were not allayed when they made the

trip with Iraqi Army backup and were confronted by SCU officers”. She noted that the

Basra Police Academy had gone into decline since it was transferred to Iraqi control in

December 2006.

1321.  On 9 February, Dr Marsden sought to explain the apparent difference between

improving Transitional Readiness Assessments of the police and the more qualitative

assessment by those on the ground that the police force had become less effective.1215

She stated:

“The measurement of transition readiness levels (defined by CPATT) is mainly based

on quantitative indicators such as who has been given what training, whether or not

police stations are producing the requisite reports, following the right procedures and

performing basic police business and whether they are properly equipped. It does

not include a moral component.

“On the positive side, we have trained and trained the lower echelons of the Basra

police (11,500 in the Shaibah college alone). They have all been equipped with

guns, cars and uniforms. There are some good units in the Basra police and a

number of good, professional middle‑ranking police officers, trying to do a good

job. But the Basra police also includes an influential minority of seriously criminal

and corrupt individuals and a large number of officers (probably the majority) who

are more or less adequate but stifled by weak leadership and intimidated by the

seriously corrupt elements and militant militias.

“The real problem is the high level of … serious police related crime … This is

evidenced by the recent interviews carried out by the Department of Internal Affairs

with tortured prisoners from the Jameat. There is evidence that some police officers

are also directly involved in anti‑MNF activity. These criminal elements are a big

part of the problem on the streets, although the size of that problem is not massive

compared to Baghdad.”

1322.  Gen Dannatt visited Iraq from 14 to 15 February.1216 He reported:

“For MND(SE), 10 IA Div clearly represent the exit strategy not only from Basra

City but elsewhere across the region … the fear is that 10 IA Div may not be as

good as we hoped it would be … But as GOC MND(SE) rightly observed, we have

regularly changed the role for which these troops were designed; they have gone

from local militia (ICDC), to regional defence force and now onto an expeditionary

footing … over the past three and a half years. However, we are where we are; the

trick now is to maintain sufficient SSR momentum to get 10 IA Div at the level of

combat effectiveness appropriate to its future role against the predicted threat. And

GOC MND(SE) is looking carefully at this. It is not simply a question of enhancing

1215  Letter Marsden to Aldred, 9 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly Report’.

1216  Minute CGS to CDS, 19 February 2007, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 14‑15 Feb 07’.

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