6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
817.
The IPU listed
actions needed that week:
•
“UK forces
will be ready to fight soon. By then we need to
have promulgated
some
principles346
to guide the
campaign for the first
few days of Phase IV.
And UK
forces are likely to be the first to confront this.”
•
“Of equal
urgency is the need to ensure
our humanitarian relief effort is
in
place. The scale of
the UK effort for humanitarian operations depends on
assessed
need and the expected contributions of others. Ministers
will need to
agree
this.” Issues of
concern included:
{{the
absence of detailed US plans for humanitarian
operations;
{{the
impact on UK planning of uncertainty about the legitimacy of
military
conflict
and the status of the Occupation;
{{the
dependence of some DFID plans on further financing decisions;
and
{{UK
forces’ lack of funding and capacity to fulfil their
humanitarian
obligations
in the absence of other providers.
The UK
military needed resources for humanitarian assistance to reduce the
risk of
humanitarian
disaster. Ms Short and Mr Hoon needed “to
agree on the modalities”.
818.
Before the
conflict began, there needed to be agreement with the US
on:
•
A Security
Council resolution allowing OFF to continue.
•
An
“authorising
UNSCR for Phase IV”. The
agreement should be announced
“to
encourage/galvanise the international community to advance their
own
preparations”.
US policy was “moving in our direction but still has some way
to
go”. The UK
needed to:
{{work
with the US to identify and define the role of the head of the
interim
civilian
administration; and
{{“push US
thinking” on an Iraqi consultative council towards
arrangements
visibly
inclusive of all segments of the population. Getting the right
political
framework
was “crucial” given that the initial period of Phase IV would
be
perceived
as a military occupation and that “the work done during the
first
weeks and
months will shape the mould for what follows”.
•
Objectives
for the day power was handed back to Iraq (as set out in
the
annotated
agenda of 5 March).
819.
Very soon
after the start of hostilities the UK needed “to agree
what our
medium‑term
contribution to Iraq should be (say from the autumn
onwards).
For this will
shape our conduct in the short term.”
Sectorisation would be a key
determinant
of UK policy.
346
The
principles were broadly as set out in the annotated agenda of 5
March.
459