The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

178.  Officials also raised concern about “the unwillingness of US personnel [in

Baghdad] to discuss security arrangements … in detail”.119 The UK would need to make

its own assessment of the national situation, potentially leading to UK staff being unable

to participate in certain CPA activities. The presence and security of UK staff sent to the

CPA would “need to be balanced against our responsibilities for the government and

reconstruction of Iraq”.

179.  Participants at the Inquiry’s civilian outreach event who served in Iraq during the

CPA period commented that intelligence on threats and no‑go areas should have been

disseminated to all civilians. They suggested that the UK had been better at this than

the US, but in Baghdad, where the US controlled security, there had been problems with

the flow of information.

180.  The AHMGIR agreed that the recommendations in the DFID/FCO security review

should be implemented as soon as possible.120

181.  Sir Hilary Synnott told the Inquiry:

“After the attack on the UN building at the end of August, the Spanish and Japanese

Governments ordered their civilians to leave. And on 30 August, of course, the

UN ordered their expatriates to leave also. Everybody else stayed. I was told by

London to draw up security regulations and to take disciplinary action if they were

not obeyed. I replied that I had already drawn up security instructions which we had

been testing, and as for taking disciplinary action, I reminded London that I actually

had no statutory authority, as far as I knew, over the nationals of another country.” 121

182.  On 28 August, Mr Crompton informed Mr Straw that Sir Hilary Synnott had

requested 34 secondees for CPA(South).122

183.  Later that day, the AHMGIR agreed, “subject to security concerns”, that:

“Hilary Synnott should be given such assistance and staff as he deemed necessary to

improve the workings of CPA South.” 123

184.  Mr Crompton visited Iraq from 31 August to 3 September.124 He concluded that

“the Coalition as a whole is only just beginning to come to terms with the scale of the

task”. The “general view” was that the job was “doable”, but the UK needed to “throw

massive resources at the problem now”. UK staffing in the South and the governorates

needed to increase significantly. The relationship between the two was “not yet clear”.

185.  Mr Crompton judged that staffing in CPA Baghdad was “about right”, but

CPA(South) was “woefully under‑staffed”. It was clear that the UK would have to fill the

119 Annotated Agenda, 28 August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

120  Minutes, 28 August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

121  Public hearing, 9 December 2009, page 111.

122  Minute Crompton to PS [FCO], 28 August 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial’.

123  Minutes, 28 August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

124  Minute Crompton to Chaplin, 5 September 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq: 31 August to 3 September’.

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