10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

774. The Strategy stated that “to help planning”, Iraq’s recovery should be considered

in three phases: stabilisation, to December 2003; recovery, to December 2004; and

normalisation, from January 2005. The Strategy defined “UK objectives” for each phase

in relation to security, the political process and reconstruction.

775. The UK’s over-arching reconstruction objective for the stabilisation phase

(to December 2003) was that Iraq would reach pre-conflict levels of “development

and order”.

776. The objective for the recovery phase, to December 2004, was that Iraq

would exceed pre-conflict levels of development and order, and plans would be

being implemented to develop Iraq’s own capacity to lead economic and physical

reconstruction.

777. The objective for the normalisation phase, from January 2005, was that Iraq

would be “largely self-supporting”, providing its own public services and with a growing

market-based economy.

778. The Strategy acknowledged that this scenario was “ambitious”. Risks to progress

included resistance to the Coalition and slow progress on the political process and

reconstruction. A protracted occupation would be costly, increase anti-Western sentiment

across the region and provide further reason for terrorist attacks in US and UK interests.

779. The UK would continue to be active in a number of areas but would, as Ministers

had directed, focus its engagement on economic management, SSR and oil. An Action

Plan covering the stabilisation phase was being developed.

780. On resources, the Strategy stated that the UK military occupation force would cost

around £1bn in 2003/04 (and less in future years). The DFID programme for 2003/04

was £201m and was fully committed. Of the £60m provided by the Treasury in April, the

FCO had been allocated £21m to cover CPA staff and security costs, and DFID had bid

for the remaining £40m.431

781. Looking ahead, the Strategy stated that departments’ bids for funding for Iraq for

2004/05 would be subject to negotiation with the Treasury. An “appropriate” level of UK

contribution to reconstruction and development was being considered in the light of

Iraq’s needs, Iraqi and international contributions, and the UK’s resource position.

782. Sir Suma Chakrabarti told the Inquiry that the UK Strategy was:

“Very important, but quite high-flown sort of stuff and not really linked to operational

detail.”432

431 The Treasury had agreed on 25 September to provide DFID with an additional £6.5m from the Reserve,

but rejected its request to earmark £33.5m for anticipated future needs.

432 Public hearing, 22 January 2010, page 4.

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