10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
387.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s advice to Mr Blair on the Red Team report focused
on
political
and security aspects of the proposed strategy.226
On the
economic aspect of
the proposed
strategy, he commented:
“There is
nothing new to say here. There will be no serious reconstruction
effort for
as long as
the security situation remains bad, and political engagement at
national
and local
levels remains poor …
“There is
little point in talking about a new surge of economic
reconstruction until
we see
the shape of the next Iraqi Government.”
388.
Hard
Lessons identified the
Red Team report as one important element of the US
strategy
review and development process initiated by Ambassador Khalilzad
which, by
the autumn
of 2005, had produced a new approach comprising:
•
A renewed
focus on broadening Sunni participation in the political
process.
•
Defeating
the insurgency using the “ink-spot” model (articulated by the
Red
Team and
others). That required closer integration of military and
civilian
resources
and the use of civilian reconstruction resources as part of
a
military‑led
campaign, and a shift away from large infrastructure projects
towards
smaller,
Iraqi-led projects designed to deliver jobs and services to the
most
vulnerable,
violent and politically significant neighbourhoods.
•
Increased
support for provincial governments, including through the
deployment
of PRTs
into provinces.
•
Increased
support for central government institutions, including by
embedding
civilian
advisers. The increased support for provincial and central
government
reflected
US analysis that their strategy of “pulling back to let the
Iraqis
do it
themselves” had failed; provincial governments remained weak
and
disconnected
from central government.227
389.
The new
strategy would become known as “Clear-Hold-Build”.
390.
On 19
September, two UK soldiers were arrested by the Iraqi Police
Service in
Basra,
following an incident in which they killed one Iraqi police officer
and wounded
another
(see Section 9.4). The soldiers, and six negotiators who had
attempted to
secure
their release and who had also been detained, were subsequently
released
in
an armed operation undertaken by MND(SE). The episode became
known as the
Jameat
incident.
226
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 19 September 2005, ‘Iraq: UK
Strategy’.
227
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009.
261