The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
to work
closely with the US on a humanitarian response, but only if there
was
an overarching
UN mandate and financial cover; and
•
“in
principle”, to make money available to the UK military for QIPs, to
be
re‑examined
if there was no UN mandate and the UK military was
“working
under a US
lead”.
251.
Ms Short
did not agree to establish a forward base in Kuwait on the grounds
that
it would
imply that military action was a certainty. DFID could make scoping
visits to the
region and
arrange for vehicles to be ready for transportation, but the
equipment should
not be
pre‑positioned in the region. Ms Short “accepted that this
would mean that DFID
would not
be prepared for an immediate response in the event of military
action or a
humanitarian
crisis on the ground”. She suggested that DFID consider providing
more
funds to
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was
undertaking
similar
preparations to those recommended by DFID officials.
252.
Ms Short
also rejected the deployment of DFID staff to Jordan and the HIC
in
Cyprus, on
the grounds that it pre‑supposed a significant role for DFID, which
it was
as yet
unable to promise.
253.
The meeting
agreed that DFID:
“… should
work through the range of different scenarios within which we might
have
to act and
in each case consider how we would respond in terms of financial
support
and the
channels through which it could be provided.”
254.
In the context
of discussion on those scenarios, Ms Short stated that
without
additional
resources, DFID “would not be able to take up the exemplary role,
working
with the UK
military, that the PM had asked us to”.
255.
Dr Brewer
told the 19 February Chiefs of Staff meeting that Ms Short,
while
working
towards full commitment through the UN, would not be seeking
additional
resources
beyond DFID’s £100m Contingency Reserve.155
256.
On 19
February, in advance of meetings with Mr Snow and other G7
finance
Ministers,
Mr Brown received a number of papers on Iraq.156
257.
In a covering
minute to those papers, a Treasury official warned that
on
reconstruction:
“Our sense
is that momentum … is developing very fast, and there is a risk
that the
financing
agenda could be set by policy decisions taken in Foreign and
Defence
Ministries.
Sharing ideas with Mr Snow may be a useful way to begin to
redress
155
Minutes, 19
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
156
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Update
on Iraq’.
484