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4.4  |  The search for WMD
774.  Also on 8 April, Mr Wood reported from Washington that there were likely to be
three UK angles to the Report of the Senate Intelligence Committee into pre-conflict
intelligence on Iraq:
the reference to yellowcake in President Bush’s State of the Union speech in
2003, on which the Committee was likely to be more critical of the US than
the UK;
the “45 minute claim” on which the Report would conclude that there was a basis
in intelligence for the public claim; and
[…].430
The transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government
775.  On 29 March, a senior SIS officer sought guidance from Mr Ehrman on the
responsibilities of the future Government of Iraq for counter-proliferation and “the legacy
of CBRN related capabilities”.431 The Coalition had had a difficult year. Questions to
consider included:
where responsibility for those issues would lie in the CPA and its successors;
how policy-makers saw the UK helping Iraq solve the “CBRN riddles remaining
from the past”; and
the point at which international organisations would be brought in to help Iraq
and the amount of preparatory work that would be necessary with the US.
776.  Mr David Landsman, Mr Dowse’s successor as the Head of FCO Counter-
Proliferation Department, co-ordinated Whitehall discussion.432 On 31 March, he sought
views on:
how long the ISG would be needed;
the legal basis for ISG operations after the transfer of sovereignty;
how the UK would engage with Iraq on other counter-proliferation activities;
what sort of co-operation programmes and assistance should be
established; and
when to bring in international agencies.
777.  A DIS official replied on 3 April.433 He reported that US thinking on the future of the
ISG was fluid. The ISG’s work had not been included in Iraq’s Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL) (see Section 9.2) and it was not yet possible to advise on the legal basis for
the ISG’s work in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty. The WMD Task Force had told
Mr Duelfer that it hoped it would be possible to produce a final report within the next
430  Letter Wood to Scarlett, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Activity in the Senate Intelligence Committee’.
431  Letter SIS [senior officer] to Ehrman, 29 March 2004, [untitled].
432  Letter Landsman to Howard, 31 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Implementing Counter-Proliferation Policy
After June’.
433  Letter [DIS] to Peters, 3 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Implementing Counter-Proliferation Policy After June’.
575
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