The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UK forces
continued to provide air traffic control and certain other services
at Basra
International
Airport (BIA) after the transition from the CPA to the IIG on 28
June 2004.
During the
Occupation, the UK considered but rejected opening BIA to
commercial flights,
due to the
potential liability for the UK (see Section 10.1).
On 14
December, the UK and IIG signed a Memorandum of Understanding
indemnifying
the UK
Government and its agents against all claims arising from the
provision of services
by UK
personnel at BIA.113
Following
that agreement, BIA reopened to commercial traffic on 1 January
2005.114
UK forces
continued to provide support.
192.
In a video
conference with President Bush on 4 January, Mr Blair said
that the US
and the UK
should support Prime Minister Allawi’s new security plan (see
Section 9.3).115
A key issue
would be funding. Reconstruction would not be a problem once the
security
situation
improved. Mr Blair asked if the US could, in the short term,
redirect some US
reconstruction
funding to security.
193.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald sent Mr Stephen Hadley, US Deputy National
Security
Advisor, a
Note by Mr Blair on 10 January, and asked him to show it to
President Bush
before
their video conference the following day.116
Mr Blair’s
Note covered “our most
pressing problems”.
“All the
problems go back to security. Without it the politics are
difficult, the
reconstruction
shackled and the faith of Iraqis in the future
undermined.”
195.
Mr Blair
considered that four actions were necessary:
•
the
Iraqiisation of security forces;
•
spending
money more quickly on reconstruction, especially of essential
services;
•
being “very
tough indeed on the election”, including by ensuring it went
ahead
on schedule
and encouraging participation; and
•
signalling
a timetable for the withdrawal of US and UK forces “when and
only
when, we
can point to real indigenous Iraqi strength”.
113
Telegram
474 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Basra
Airport’.
114
Minute
Allardice to DTI [junior official], 12 January 2005, ‘Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq
Reconstruction,
13 January 2005’ attaching Briefing, [undated], ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial
Group on Iraq
Reconstruction’.
115
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 4 January 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 4 January 2005;
Iraq, Iran
and MEPP’.
116
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 10 January 2005, [untitled], attaching Note
Prime Minister to
President Bush,
10 January 2005, ‘Note’. Mr Hadley
succeeded Dr Rice as US National Security Advisor
later that
month.
228