The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
change the
regime in Iraq, because there are numerous countries where one
wished
to see
another regime. But if we go down that road, where are we
going?”
450.
President
Chirac stated that military action was possible “if it’s decided by
the
international
community on the basis of indisputable proof. For the moment, we
have
neither
proof, nor decisions …”
451.
In a
conversation with Mr Blair on 9 September, President Chirac
reiterated his
points.141
Mr Blair
gave him a report of his talks with President Bush. Mr Blair
told
President
Chirac that a UN resolution must focus on WMD, not regime change,
and
ensure that
the inspectors could return unconditionally and do their job
properly.
452.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that President Chirac supported a resolution seeking
the
return of
inspectors but was concerned that some in the US wanted Saddam
Hussein
to refuse
to justify military action. In President Chirac’s view, there would
have to
be a second
resolution to justify military action “and that would not be
adopted”.
Mr Blair
responded that that “would depend on the circumstances”. If the
inspectors
returned
and Saddam’s WMD were disarmed, the nature of the regime would
change.
Saddam Hussein
should be given the chance to comply. If he refused to do
so,
we should
be tough.
453.
In response to
a question from President Chirac about whether the UK was
sure
that Saddam
Hussein had WMD, Mr Blair said that: “Personally he had no
doubt that
Saddam was
trying to rebuild his WMD capacity.” Mr Blair’s view
was:
“… we
should move to the point where the choice was Saddam’s. Either
he
accepted
and abided by the new resolution, or we would have to act to ensure
that
he abided
by it.”
454.
After further
discussion of the US approach and its potential impact,
Mr Blair said
that he had
made clear to President Bush the need to take action to relaunch
the MEPP
and the
importance of Afghanistan. He was “convinced that through
co‑operation with
the US on
Iraq it would be possible to make progress in other
areas”.
455.
Following a
conversation between Mr Jean‑David Levitte, French
Permanent
Representative
to the UN, and Sir Jeremy Greenstock on 11 September, the UK
Mission
to the UN
New York reported that the French view was:
•
Two
resolutions were the only way of achieving consensus and building
a
coalition
on Iraq. France would negotiate a second resolution, if needed, in
a
“positive
spirit”.
•
Consultations
should start in capitals with the Permanent Five in New
York
discussing
“concepts” not a draft text.
141
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Chirac,
9 September’.
170