11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
It is
important to note that the majority of former regime elements and
Ba’athists may
not be
‘restorationists’.”148
180.
On 19 January,
the JIC assessed that Sunni turnout in elections might be as low
as
one‑third
of the eligible voters, which would give a disproportionately low
representation
to Sunni
Arabs in the elected institutions.149
The policy
implication of this was, in the
JIC’s view,
that “Sunni outreach will need to intensify after the elections to
ensure that
Sunnis do
not opt out of the political and constitutional drafting process
altogether”.
181.
In early
February, the JIC judged that the “hard core and most
effective” Sunni
Arab
insurgents were former Ba’athists, but the bulk of those involved
were simply
disaffected
Iraqis “most of whom probably have no long‑term political
objectives”.150
182.
Elections for
the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and for
Provincial
Assemblies
took place across Iraq on 30 January 2005.151
Results
were announced
183.
On 7 April,
the Assembly elected its first Speaker and swore in the
future
Presidential
Council and Prime Minister, Dr Ibrahim al‑Ja’afari, of the
Dawa Party.153
Prime
Minister Designate Ja’afari presented the majority of his Cabinet
to the TNA for
ratification
on 28 April and took office on 3 May.154
The
elections and their outcome are
described
in more detail in Section 9.3.
184.
On 23
February, Mr Tim Torlot, Deputy Head of Mission at the British
Embassy
Baghdad,
called on Dr Ja’afari and explained that the UK saw merit in a
“National
Reconciliation
Conference” which might demonstrate the Transitional
Government’s
commitment
to a fully inclusive political process.155
Dr Ja’afari
endorsed the idea, but
preferred
“National Dialogue Conference” because:
“… too many
people now associated the word ‘reconciliation’ with
co‑operation
with former
Ba’athists or criminals. Such a meeting could involve anyone who
was
prepared to
renounce violence.”
185.
A UK strategy
for Iraq in 2005 co‑ordinated by the Cabinet Office in
February
2005
suggested that “resolving the de‑Ba’athification
dilemma to
allow Security Sector
148
Report DIS,
7 January 2005, ‘Nature of the Insurgency in Iraq’.
149
JIC
Assessment, 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections Update’.
150
JIC
Assessment, 3 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Insurgency and
Counter‑Insurgency’.
151
Public
hearing Chaplin, 7 December 2009, page 12.
152
Telegram 99
Baghdad to FCO London, 13 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Provisional
Election Results’.
153
BBC
News, 7 April
2005, Talabani:
Iraq’s pragmatic new leader.
154
eGram
3590/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 April 2005, ‘Iraq: New Cabinet
Ratified by the TNA’.
155
Telegram
114 Baghdad to FCO London, 23 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Call on
Ja’afari, UIC Nominee for
Prime
Minister, 23 February’.
37