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11.1  |  De-Ba’athification
It is important to note that the majority of former regime elements and Ba’athists may
not be ‘restorationists’.”148
180.  On 19 January, the JIC assessed that Sunni turnout in elections might be as low as
one‑third of the eligible voters, which would give a disproportionately low representation
to Sunni Arabs in the elected institutions.149 The policy implication of this was, in the
JIC’s view, that “Sunni outreach will need to intensify after the elections to ensure that
Sunnis do not opt out of the political and constitutional drafting process altogether”.
181.  In early February, the JIC judged that the “hard core and most effective” Sunni
Arab insurgents were former Ba’athists, but the bulk of those involved were simply
disaffected Iraqis “most of whom probably have no long‑term political objectives”.150
The Transitional National Assembly’s de‑Ba’athification
policy
182.  Elections for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and for Provincial
Assemblies took place across Iraq on 30 January 2005.151 Results were announced
on 13 February.152
183.  On 7 April, the Assembly elected its first Speaker and swore in the future
Presidential Council and Prime Minister, Dr Ibrahim al‑Ja’afari, of the Dawa Party.153
Prime Minister Designate Ja’afari presented the majority of his Cabinet to the TNA for
ratification on 28 April and took office on 3 May.154 The elections and their outcome are
described in more detail in Section 9.3.
184.  On 23 February, Mr Tim Torlot, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy
Baghdad, called on Dr Ja’afari and explained that the UK saw merit in a “National
Reconciliation Conference” which might demonstrate the Transitional Government’s
commitment to a fully inclusive political process.155 Dr Ja’afari endorsed the idea, but
preferred “National Dialogue Conference” because:
“… too many people now associated the word ‘reconciliation’ with co‑operation
with former Ba’athists or criminals. Such a meeting could involve anyone who was
prepared to renounce violence.”
185.  A UK strategy for Iraq in 2005 co‑ordinated by the Cabinet Office in February
2005 suggested that “resolving the de‑Ba’athification dilemma to allow Security Sector
148 Report DIS, 7 January 2005, ‘Nature of the Insurgency in Iraq’.
149 JIC Assessment, 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections Update’.
150 JIC Assessment, 3 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Insurgency and Counter‑Insurgency’.
151 Public hearing Chaplin, 7 December 2009, page 12.
152 Telegram 99 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Provisional Election Results’.
153 BBC News, 7 April 2005, Talabani: Iraq’s pragmatic new leader.
154 eGram 3590/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 April 2005, ‘Iraq: New Cabinet Ratified by the TNA’.
155 Telegram 114 Baghdad to FCO London, 23 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Call on Ja’afari, UIC Nominee for
Prime Minister, 23 February’.
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