6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
35.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that he had been “quite surprised” when
later on the
US “started
planning as quickly as they did in Iraq, that they were doing so
before they
sorted out
Afghanistan”.19
36.
The MOD
view in late January 2002 about the wisdom of taking any
military
action was
cautious. It identified an opportunity to influence US thinking,
which
was far
from settled.
37.
On 24 January
2002, Dr Simon Cholerton, Assistant Director in
Secretariat
(Overseas)
(Sec(O)), wrote to Mr Hoon, setting out the risks of taking
action against Iraqi
air
defences in response to Iraqi violations in the No‑Fly
Zones.20
That would
require
careful
handling to avoid being seen as the next phase of “the war on
international
terrorism”.
38.
Dr Cholerton
discussed the possibility of wider action against Iraq. He
emphasised
that
neither the MOD nor the FCO had seen any “detailed US planning”.
Work on
policy
options, at both military and political levels, was continuing in
the US but “little,
if anything
has been shared with the UK”.
39.
The case
against Iraq, as “a candidate for ‘Phase 2’ in the GWOT [Global
War
on
Terrorism]”, would be based on the threat to US national security
posed by Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction programme in the absence of any evidence of
Iraqi
involvement
in the 9/11 attacks. US thinking was far from settled and there
“should be
a window
of opportunity to influence the US position”.
40.
Dr Cholerton
also advised that the “initial assessment of the efficacy (never
mind
the
legality) of military action to effect regime change is that it is
poor”. He drew attention
to the work
commissioned by Mr Tebbit in December 2001, which had
addressed the
strengths
and weaknesses of the INC. That had concluded that there was “no
Northern
Alliance
equivalent … who could take advantage of precision bombing” in
Iraq.
41.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that the “long experience of patrolling the No‑Fly
Zones”
was “a
significant factor” in subsequent discussions about military
intervention in Iraq:
“There was
increasing concern about the risks involved in these operations and
the
consequences
for example if a British or American aircraft was shot down. It
was
certainly
speculated at the time that this could lead to military
intervention to rescue
downed
personnel; and that such operations could lead to a wider
engagement.”21
19
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 4.
20
Minute
Cholerton to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq:
No Fly Zones’.
21
Statement,
2 April 2015, paragraph 11.
181