6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
to base
movements”.624
It was
“almost certain that political Islam would become more
prominent
in post-Saddam Iraq”. The FCO did not expect “a massive surge in
extremist
sentiment”,
but did anticipate that a number of extremist groups were likely to
use
violence to
pursue political ends.
1416.
The paper
proposed a number of “practical steps” to provide stability,
including:
“Maintaining
firm control on the internal security situation and moving quickly
to suppress
any
international terrorist groups in the country.”
1417.
Briefing
prepared by the FCO for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush
on
31 January
2003 included in its list of objectives: “To convince President
Bush … the US
needs to
pay much more attention, quickly, to planning on ‘day after’
issues; and that
the UN
needs to be central to it.”625
One of the
advantages of the UN route was that, by
reducing
hostility to the Coalition, it “reduces risk that our actions serve
as a recruiting
sergeant
for Islamist terrorist organisations”.
1418.
Mr Ochmanek,
one of the contributors to the Adelphi Paper read by Mr Blair
in
mid-February,
concluded that, even if an invasion were successful in defeating
the Iraqi
military
and deposing Saddam Hussein’s regime:
“Success in
the endgame – providing a secure environment for the remaking of
the
political
system and culture of Iraq – cannot simply be assumed. The
emergence of
tribally-based
or ethnically-based insurgent or terrorist groups unreconciled to
the
post-Saddam
order cannot be ruled out, particularly if the regime in Iran chose
to
sponsor and
harbour such groups …”626
1419.
The first DIS
Red Team report, issued on 28 February, warned of the risk
of
creating
fertile ground for Al Qaida, which could deliberately cause
civilian casualties to
undermine
the establishment of a representative Iraqi-led
administration.627
1420.
Potential
Iranian interference in post-conflict Iraq was a theme of
UK
analysis
from February 2002.
1421.
In February
2003, the JIC assessed that Iranian reactions to a
Coalition
presence in
southern Iraq were unclear, but “unlikely to be
aggressive”.
Iran’s aims
included ensuring a leading role for its allies among the Iraqi
Shia.
624
Paper DSI,
[undated], ‘Islamism in Iraq’.
625
Paper
Middle East Department, 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to
Camp David, 31 January:
Iraq’.
626
Ochmanek
D. A Possible
US-led Campaign Against Iraq: Key Factors and an
Assessment. In:
Dodge
T &
Simon S (eds), Iraq at the
Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime
Change.
IISS
Adelphi
Paper 354. Oxford University Press. January 2003.
627
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team –
Regional responses to
conflict in
Iraq and the Aftermath’ attaching Paper, DIS Red Team, ‘Regional
Responses to Conflict in Iraq
and the
Aftermath’.
559