The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
159.
In respect of
developments at the UN, the Assessment stated:
“In
conjunction with pressure from the US, developments at the UN since
November
2001
threaten to de-rail Saddam’s long-term strategy of refusing to
comply with
UNSCRs on
weapons inspectors while working to circumvent sanctions
and
encourage
their erosion. UK and US proposals to introduce the Goods Review
List
(GRL) in
June 2002 … undermine Iraq’s propaganda over sanctions by offering
Iraq
unrestricted
access to most goods. Iraq therefore sees the GRL as making
sanctions
politically
sustainable indefinitely. Russia’s acceptance of UNSCR 1382
while
accepting
only ill-defined assurances on steps to clarify UNSCR 1284 … was
also
a defeat
for Iraq.”
160.
In response,
there were signs that Iraq had “embarked on a nominal
policy of
re-engagement
with the UN and a diplomatic charm offensive”. Mr
Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s
Deputy
Prime Minister, had visited Moscow and Beijing in early 2002 “to
solicit support
against
sanctions and the US threat […]”.
161.
The Assessment
added:
“But
this
tactical diplomacy has failed to improve Iraq’s
position. […] The
UN
Secretary-General
has been wary of accepting Saddam’s suggestion of a
renewed
dialogue
and accurately perceives Iraq’s wish to prevaricate …”
162.
In relation to
Iraq’s WMD programme, the Assessment stated:
“… Iraq
continues to pursue the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Though we
lack precise data, Iraq has probably reconstituted many of
the
elements
struck during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. Iraq’s
ballistic
missile
programme has extensively tested missiles under the 150km UN limit
and
intelligence
indicates that design work for systems with ranges over 1,000km
is
underway.
Iraq is assessed to have hidden 10-20 Al Hussein missiles (range
650km)
capable of
hitting Israel. Iraq also continues with its chemical and
biological warfare
(CBW)
programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce
significant
quantities
of BW agent within days and CW agents within weeks of a
decision
to do so …
These can be delivered by a variety of means. Methods of
ensuring
survivability
of CBW production facilities from attack are a high
priority.
“Procurement
activity suggests that Iraq is continuing with a nuclear
weapons
programme,
although its current status is unclear. Before the Gulf War
intervened,
Iraqi plans
were well advanced and we judge they were only three years away
from
possessing
a nuclear weapon. Were sanctions lifted now, we judge it would
take
Iraq at
least five years to produce a nuclear weapon and a further two to
produce
a warhead.
The acquisition of fissile material or significant technical
assistance
from abroad
could significantly shorten this timescale. Iraq still has some low
grade
radioactive
material which it could utilise in a radiological dispersal device,
but there
is no
recent intelligence indicating that Iraq is pursuing such a
course.”
414