The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
544.
Lt Gen Kiszely
reflected that:
“As a
nation which contributes only about 5 percent of the forces and 1
percent
of the
money, UK continues to exert influence on campaign direction and
conduct
disproportionate
to its contribution …”
545.
Of the 27
nations with the coalition, only the UK sought to exert influence
over the
US by
committing significant numbers of officers to MNF-I and MNC-I
headquarters.
Lt Gen
Kiszely considered that the ability to do so “results largely from
identifying key
posts and
filling them with the right officers”. He suggested that the
influence and
effectiveness
of some officers would be enhanced by increased tour
lengths:
“With the
US military on 12-month tours, the 6-month UK tours create
turbulence
and attract
criticism. This is particularly the case for appointments involved
in
developing
relationships with host-nation officers and officials. We should
identify
posts
requiring longer tour-lengths, increase them to 9-12 month tours,
and provide
appropriate
support packages.”
546.
On 19 April, a
CIG assessed the threat posed by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi’s
organisation
to British interests in Iraq, prompted by a statement claiming to
be from
AQ-I which
had appeared on several websites, some of which had previously been
used
by
al-Zarqawi for similar purposes.302
547.
The statement
threatened intensive military attacks against UK forces
and
their
allies in the south of Iraq, and also attacks against Iraqi “agents
and spies” and
“collaborators”
working with the UK.
548.
Although the
authenticity of the statement could not be verified, the JIC
judged
that “it
must be taken seriously”. The JIC assessed that the threat posed in
Iraq was
“diverse”,
as al-Zarqawi had in the past been responsible for suicide
bombings, complex
attacks and
kidnappings.
549.
The JIC judged
that non-military UK interests in Iraq, although not
specifically
mentioned
in the statement, could be under threat as well as military and
civilian targets
in the
South. Attacks on UK interests outside Iraq could not be ruled
out.
550.
On 19 April,
the Iraq Senior Officials Group was briefed that delays in forming
the
ITG were
having an impact on the constitutional process, “putting its
already ambitious
timetable
under even greater pressure”.303
551.
Further delay
was possible because of the TAL’s “lack of resonance as an
Iraqi
document”.
Delays to the parliamentary elections scheduled for December would
mean
additional
costs for the MNF-I in maintaining security.
302
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2005, ‘Al-Zarqawi Threatens UK forces in
Iraq’.
303
Letter
Fergusson to Asquith, 19 April 2005, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials
Group’.
482