9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

103. The paper concluded with a caution that:

“… any substantial prolongation of the UK military commitment in Iraq at current

force levels would have significant impact on individual personnel, the logistic

feasibility of any commitment in Afghanistan, and overall resourcing. If drawdown in

Iraq were to slip significantly, the MOD would be able to resource Options 2 and 3

in terms of manpower and equipment, but the effects … [on personnel, logistics and

overall resourcing] would be exacerbated significantly.”

104. When the MOD paper was circulated to DOP members for consideration, it was

accompanied by an appendix, produced by Cabinet Office officials, setting out the

estimates of financial pressures associated with the Iraq campaign during the financial

years 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08.

105. The minutes of the DOP discussion on 21 July do not indicate that there was any

discussion of the specific impact on the Iraq campaign of the proposed deployment to

Helmand.51

106. Dr Reid argued that “sorting out Helmand” was central to resolving Afghanistan’s

wider problems and that a UK deployment was a necessary, though “not sufficient”,

element in this. Given the security situation, if the deployment went ahead, it would

have to be on the basis of the largest option: a PRT with an infantry battlegroup and full

helicopter support.

107. General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, did make reference to

Iraq, and advised DOP that the risk of UK casualties in Helmand would be higher than in

northern Afghanistan, but lower than in Iraq.

108. Mr Des Browne, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, questioned whether the

UK could afford to take on another substantial military operation, given the cost of

operations in Iraq.

109. DOP agreed in principle to deploy the PRT to Helmand with an infantry battlegroup

and full helicopter support.

110. The paper provided for DOP’s discussion said that this option comprised “around

2,500 personnel in total”.52

111. On 22 July, Sir Nigel Sheinwald provided Mr Blair with a minute entitled

‘Iraq: A Comprehensive Strategy’.53

51 Minutes, 21 July 2005, DOP meeting.

52 Paper MOD officials, 19 July 2005, ‘Afghanistan: Resources and Strategic Planning’.

53 Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 22 July 2005, ‘Iraq: A Comprehensive Strategy’.

507