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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
408.  Mr Hoon also proposed that Mr Blair might raise with President Bush “the need for
a comprehensive public handling strategy, so that we can explain convincingly why we
need to take such drastic action against Iraq’s WMD now”.
409.  Mr Straw pointed out that the evidence did not explain why the threat from
Iraq would justify military action.
410.  On 25 March, Mr Straw sent a personal minute to Mr Blair on the way ahead
on Iraq.
411.  In relation to the draft document for publication, Mr Straw wrote that making the
case that “Saddam and the Iraq regime are bad” was “easy”, but there were four areas
where there was “a long way to go to convince” the PLP, including about “the scale of
the threat from Iraq and why this has got worse recently” and “what distinguishes the
Iraqi threat from that of eg Iran and North Korea so as to justify military action”.180
412.  Mr Straw advised that the Iraqi regime posed “a most serious threat to its
neighbours, and therefore to international security” but, from “the documents so far
presented it has been hard to glean whether the threat from Iraq is so significantly
different” as to justify military action. There was:
“… no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida …
“… Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September.
What has, however, changed is the tolerance of the international community …”
413.  Addressing the difference between Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Mr Straw wrote:
“By linking these countries together in his ‘axis of evil’ speech, President Bush
implied an identity between them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms of
the action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of work will now need to be done
to delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so much more
justified than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case – that Iraq poses a
unique and present danger – rests on the fact that it:
invaded a neighbour;
has used WMD, and would use them again;
is in breach of nine UNSCRs.”
MOD consideration of Iraq’s ability to acquire a nuclear capability
414.  Work in the MOD in late March to address the difference between US and UK
estimates of the time Iraq would need to acquire a nuclear weapon exposed the
extent of the difficulties Iraq would face.
180  Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002, ‘Crawford/Iraq’.
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