The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
579.
The JIC
addressed the wider terrorist threat in the event of military
conflict on
10 February
2003 (see Section 6.5).
580.
The FCO
paper ‘Models for Administering a Post-Saddam Iraq’ identified
a
number of
arguments against establishing a US military governorate,
concluding
that:
•
A UN
mandate would be critical in any post-conflict
scenario.
•
The
Coalition would need to retain responsibility for security for
some
time.
•
The
Coalition would also need to control and administer Iraq for
an
unknown
period before the creation of an interim
administration.
•
A UN-led
Transitional Authority would be most appropriate model for
the
interim
administration.
581.
The FCO
recommended that work should begin on examining a
possible
UN role
in more detail.
582.
It did not
address the implications of the different models for the
UK.
583.
On 4 October,
the FCO sent Sir David Manning a draft of the third paper in
its
series on
post-conflict issues: ‘Models for Administering a Post-Saddam
Iraq’.308
584.
A second
version with a small number of revisions was handed to the AHGI
on
585.
The analysis
in the paper rested on three assumptions:
“a. the
US-led Coalition takes control of Iraq following a short campaign
which does
not cause a
humanitarian crisis or extensive damage to
infrastructure;
b. there
has been no significant WMD usage; and
c. Saddam’s
regime has been removed almost entirely, no alternative regime
had
replaced
him (eg a military junta) and there have been no uprisings by the
Kurds
or
Shia.”
586.
The authors
warned: “These assumptions are optimistic. The reality is likely to
be
more
complicated, making the transition to a civilian administration
harder.” They also
emphasised
that much would depend on the legal basis of the campaign: in the
absence
308
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Models for Administering a
Post-Saddam Iraq’ attaching
Paper
[draft] FCO, [undated], ‘Models for Administering a Post-Saddam
Iraq’.
309
Paper FCO,
[undated, version received at AHGI, 11 October 2002], ‘Models for
Administering a Post-
Saddam
Iraq’.
212