The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
seek
“general UK responsibility for the administration of any geographic
area of Iraq in
167.
Mr Dominick
Chilcott, the Head of the IPU from February 2003 to June 2004,
told
the Inquiry
that there was:
“… a great
deal of hesitancy within Whitehall about the concept of a British
sector
mainly
because of the resources that would be involved in making a success
of it
… the
Treasury and DFID both expressing, for slightly different reasons,
hesitancy
about the
assumption that there would be a British sector.”111
168.
Mr Brown
received a number of papers from Treasury officials before the
meeting.
169.
A paper
produced by Mr Dodds highlighted the financial implications of
the
assumption
in “US/UK military planning” that UK forces would take
responsibility for
an area
of Iraq after the conflict.112
170.
Mr Dodds
advised that the Chiefs of Staff had estimated that the UK could
sustain
a brigade
and headquarters (around 10,000 troops) in Iraq indefinitely, and
that this force
would be
sufficient to fulfil the UK responsibilities for Basra
Province.
171.
Mr Dodds
advised that the cost of such an ongoing operation was likely to
be
about £1bn
a year. It was a reasonable assumption that the UK’s commitment
would last
“at least
two years and possibly significantly longer”. He
continued:
“We have
pressed MOD on how these costs might be reduced. The options
are:
a.
to tell the
US that we feel we have played our part after Phase IVA
[immediate
post‑conflict
stabilisation] and that other coalition partners must be found
to
take on our
role …;
b. to give
up the leadership role and to contribute a small component to
the
leadership
of others;
c. to lead
a sector … with a range of forces drawn from other
countries.
To keep
cost to a minimum, we should scale down our commitments as rapidly
as
possible.”
172.
Mr Dodds
summarised his arguments:
“•
On public
finance grounds there is a strong case for stepping back from
military
leadership
in the aftermath and allowing other countries to take on this
role.
•
If
Ministers want Britain to continue to be in a leadership position
there will be
significant
costs …
110
Paper IPU,
5 March 2003, ‘Planning for the UK’s Role in Iraq after
Saddam’.
111
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 28.
112
Paper
Treasury, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq – the Aftermath – Military
Options’.
470