Executive
Summary
529.
The dossier
drew on the 9 September JIC Assessment, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical
and
Biological
Weapons – Possible Scenarios’, which had been commissioned to
address
scenarios
for Iraq’s possible use of chemical and biological weapons in the
event of
military
action, previous JIC Assessments and the subsequent report issued
by SIS
on 11
September.
530.
The SIS report
should have been shown to the relevant experts in the
Defence
Intelligence
Staff (DIS) who could have advised their senior managers and
the
Assessments
Staff.
531.
Expert
officials in DIS questioned the certainty with which some of the
judgements
in the
dossier were expressed. Some of their questions were discussed
during the
preparation
of the dossier. The text was agreed by Air Marshal Joe French,
Chief of
Defence
Intelligence, at the JIC meeting on 19 September.
532.
There is no
evidence that other members of the JIC were aware at the time of
the
reservations
recorded in the minute by Dr Brian Jones (the branch head of
the nuclear,
biological
and chemical section in the Scientific and Technical Directorate of
the Defence
Intelligence
Staff) of 19 September and that written by the chemical weapons
expert in
his team
the following day.
533.
The JIC
accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There
is
no evidence
that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that
No.10
improperly
influenced the text.
534.
At issue are
the judgements made by the JIC and how they and the
intelligence
were
presented, including in Mr Blair’s Foreword and in his
statement to Parliament
on 24
September 2002.
535.
It is unlikely
that Parliament and the public would have distinguished
between
the ownership
and therefore the authority of the judgements in the Foreword and
those
in the
Executive Summary and the main body of the dossier.
536.
In the
Foreword, Mr Blair stated that he believed the “assessed
intelligence” had
“established
beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had “continued to produce
chemical
and
biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop
nuclear weapons,
and that he
had been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile
programme”.
That raises
two key questions.
•
Did Mr
Blair’s statements in whole or in part go further than the
assessed
intelligence?
•
Did that
matter?
537.
The Inquiry is
not questioning Mr Blair’s belief, which he consistently
reiterated
in his
evidence to the Inquiry, or his legitimate role in advocating
Government policy.
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