9.1 | March
to 22 May 2003
7.
Mr Powell
suggested that Mr Blair should “corral” President Bush into some
general
principles
about the role of the UN in post-conflict Iraq, observing that the
US desire to
confine
that role to managing non-governmental organisations “won’t do”. He
advised:
“We do not
want to give the UN control of the military or the government, but
there has
to be some
international legitimacy.”
8.
In his own
note, Sir David Manning agreed with Mr Powell’s points and
commented
that
President Bush should also be encouraged to analyse the reasons
behind a “strong
current of
anti-Americanism” around much of the world.2
9.
A US draft of
a new Security Council resolution for the post-conflict phase in
Iraq was
shared with
the British Embassy Washington on 21 March.3
10.
The two key
points of difference between it and the UK draft were the
relationship
between the
UN Special Co-ordinator and a transitional civilian authority, and
the
question of
who would establish an Iraqi Interim Administration
(IIA).4
11.
The US draft
also included three options for a funding mechanism to
cover
post-invasion
costs; there was not yet a firm US view on which option was
preferred.
12.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy
Washington,
reported
that some in Washington “still do not think that any form of UN
resolution is
legally
necessary”.
13.
In a telephone
call on 22 March, Mr Blair raised the UN’s role with President
Bush.5
14.
Mr Blair said
that it was essential to get a UN ‘badge’ for post-conflict efforts
and
that, while
the Coalition did not want to hand over the results of its efforts
to the UN, a
Security
Council resolution on post-conflict administration would help the
Coalition get
access to
UN funding, including from the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs).
15.
Mr Blair
proposed that different parts of the draft resolution should
proceed on
different
timescales; a resolution on the Oil-for-Food programme
(OFF)6
should
move
quickly,
with one covering administration after the conflict to
follow.7
2
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 21 March 2003, ‘Bush
Discussion’.
3
Telegram
367 Washington to FCO London, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: US
Draft Resolution for
Post-conflict
Administration’.
4
The terms
Iraqi Interim Authority and Iraqi Interim Administration are used
interchangeably in
contemporary
documents.
5
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 22 March:
Post-Conflict
Issues’.
6
The OFF
allowed for the export of Iraqi oil, the deposit of oil revenues
into a UN-controlled account and
the use of
those revenues to procure food, medicine and other goods approved
by the UN.
7
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 22 March:
Post-Conflict
Issues’.
133