9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
353.
The British
Embassy Washington did not know what Secretary Gates’ views
and
advice
would be but colleagues in the National Security Council and State
Department
had said
they should expect “surges” in US support for reconciliation and
reconstruction.
A new Iraq
strategy was expected to be announced by President Bush in the
second
week of
January.
354.
Sir David’s
advice was that:
“… we
should remain cautious about drawing conclusions before the
meetings of
Principals
have taken place. Right now the presumption is that there will be a
surge
in the
level of US troops in the first half of 2007.”
355.
Mr Jonathan
Powell met Mr Karl Rove, President Bush’s Deputy Chief of
Staff,
and Mr Josh
Bolten, President Bush’s Chief of Staff, in Washington on 21
December.193
They told
him that President Bush would “almost certainly” announce 20,000
additional
US troops
for Iraq, remaining until 2008.
356.
On Christmas
Day, UK forces led an attack against the Jameat police HQ in
Basra,
the base of
the Serious Crime Unit.194
357.
The British
Embassy Office Basra reported that when British troops entered
the
HQ they
found 127 prisoners, over 80 percent of whom showed signs of
torture. The ISF
played a
“significant” role in the operation, processing and transferring
the prisoners,
although
last minute “cold feet” had meant that the Iraqi Brigade intended
to supply an
outer
cordon were ordered not to do so.
358.
The British
Embassy Office also reported a significant Iraqi reaction to the
attack.
Although
the view of the majority of Basrawis was “good riddance”, some
members of
the Basra
Provincial Council publicly criticised the operation.
359.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that it was a “deliberate operation” that
he had
discussed
with the Basra security committee in advance:
“Minister
Bulani, who was Minister of the Interior, authorised the
disbandment of
the Serious
Crimes Unit. When we went to see Maliki in, I think it was mid to
late
October,
with the security committee, he directed Hamadi to crush the police
death
squads.
Before the operation, one of the Basra judges issued an arrest
warrant for
the 62 most
wanted of the police.”195
360.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that reactions to the operation
were:
“Maliki was
generally supportive, Governor Waili was delighted, the tribal
sheikhs
within
Basra were delighted, the principal cleric of the largest Shia
mosque in Basra,
193
Minute
Powell to Prime Minister, 21 December 2006, ‘White
House’.
194
eGram
57155/06 Basra to FCO London, 28 December 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Action Against Serious
Crimes
Unit’.
195
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 27‑29.
67