4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
wanted a
nuclear weapons capability while retaining the judgement that it
was
working to
achieve one.
•
Removal of
the reference to Iraq’s past exploration into the use of
radiological
dispersal
devices.
•
The
statement “We judge that Iraq has a covert chemical and
biological
weapons
programme …” was changed to: “We assess that …”
338.
An FCO note
summarising the history of attempts to get weapons
inspectors
back into
Iraq, sent to No.10 on 15 March, in response to a request from
Mr Blair, is
addressed
in Section 3.2.154
339.
The FCO
News Department prepared a draft media strategy suggesting
that
momentum
could be built by feeding the media information on WMD and
ensuring
that, if
military action became necessary, it would be clear that other
means had
been
exhausted and it was Saddam Hussein who was at fault.
340.
It is not
clear what prompted this advice or how authoritatively it
represented
the FCO
position at the time. But it does provide an indication of the
thinking in
the FCO
News Department about the prospect of military action. It was sent
to
Ministers
and senior officials in the FCO, and to Mr Campbell in
No.10.
341.
As part of the
wider policy debate on Iraq, which is addressed in Section
3.2,
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw were, by mid-March, both addressing the need for
an effective
message
about the specific threat posed by Iraq to underpin the wider
strategy.
342.
Mr John
Williams, Head of the FCO News Department, sent Mr Straw’s
Private
Office
advice on a media strategy on 11 March, stating:
“The
process of preparing media and public opinion for possible action
on Iraq is
under way
…
“The Prime
Minister’s interviews in Australia and the Foreign Secretary’s
piece in
The
Times have
established a solid base from which to work. The media has
taken
the point
and is eager for detail. There is high interest in evidence being
compiled for
the dossier
with [sic] the UK will share with the US.
“We should
exploit this interest by feeding newspapers and broadcasters
with
information
on WMD, diversion of imports for military use, and human rights
abuse:
154
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 15 March 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note, ‘Iraq:
Weapons Inspectors’.
77