4.3 | Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

in the failure by the United States and Britain to prove any allegation that Iraq has

possessed such weapons in recent years, and especially during the period following

the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002).”

490. Mr Aldouri stated that the inspectors had “refuted all the misleading information

that was presented” by the US and the UK; and that the inspectors had “proved that

information to be false”, including the information that Secretary Powell had “worked

so arduously to put before the Council as damning evidence”. The US and the UK had

failed to “provide even a shred of evidence”.

491. Mr Aldouri concluded by reaffirming that Iraq would “continue to work with the

Security Council to make the truth known” that Iraq was “free of weapons of mass

destruction”. Iraq hoped that the Council would “continue to search for a peaceful

solution to the crisis, ensure that the work of the inspectors continues and resume the

Oil-for-Food programme”.

492. Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported:

“Even at the precipice of war, Aldouri maintains Iraq has no WMD.”184

493. Three streams of pre-invasion intelligence reporting on Iraq were withdrawn

by SIS after the invasion:

• the reports of 11 and 23 September 2002 were withdrawn on 29 July 2003;

• all the reporting from the sourcing chain that had produced the “45 minutes

report” was withdrawn on 28 September 2004; and

• all the reporting from Curve Ball, the source who had provided material on

the mobile production facilities for chemical and biological weapons, was

withdrawn on 29 September 2004.

494. SIS issued two reports on Iraqi CBW, from a new source on trial, about the

production of chemical and biological agents in September 2002.

495. The first report on 11 September stated that:

• Iraq had accelerated the production of chemical and biological agents;

• it had built further facilities throughout Iraq; and

• Saddam Hussein was determined to maintain his CBW capability.

496. SIS also stated that it expected to receive substantial additional material on Iraq’s

biological and chemical programme through the same source.

184 Telegram 492 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 19 March Open Debate’.

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