The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
18.
Sir David also
identified questions Mr Blair might ask, including what sort
of
battlefield
environment was anticipated, and the response to any use of
biological
weapons
(BW) or chemical weapons (CW).
19.
The record of
the 23 July meeting written by Mr Matthew Rycroft, one of
Mr Blair’s
two Private
Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, noted:
•
Mr Scarlett
summarised the intelligence and latest [4 July] JIC
Assessment:
“Saddam’s
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way
to
overthrow
it was likely to be by massive military action.” Saddam Hussein
was
“worried
and expected an attack”, but he was “not convinced” that an
attack
would be
“immediate or overwhelming”. Real support for Saddam Hussein
was
“probably
narrowly based”.
•
Sir Richard
Dearlove reported that there was “a perceptible shift in
attitude”
in
Washington: “Military action was now seen as inevitable.” President
Bush
“wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction
of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around
the policy.
The NSC [National Security Council] had no patience with the
UN
route and
no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s
record.”7
20.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that the meeting concluded that the UK “should work on
the
assumption
that the UK would take part in any military action”. Mr Blair
also asked for
further
advice on a number of issues, including that Mr Scarlett would
send Mr Blair
a full intelligence
update.
21.
In a separate
record circulated more widely in Whitehall, Mr Rycroft wrote
that
it had
been suggested that Mr Scarlett provide a weekly update, on
Friday mornings
for Mr Blair’s
weekend box.8
22.
In his account
of the meeting in his diaries, Mr Campbell wrote, in relation
to the
points made
on WMD, that:
•
Mr Straw
had “said of the four powers posing a potential threat with WMD
…
Iraq would
be fourth. He [Saddam Hussein] does not have nukes, he has
some
offensive
WMD capability. The tough question is whether this is just
regime
change or
is the issue WMD.”
•
Mr Blair
“said he needed to be convinced first of the workability of the
military
plan, and
second of an equally workable political strategy. Jack [Straw]
said
we could
probably get the votes for a UN ultimatum, but the Americans
may
not want to
go down that route. TB saw regime change as the route to
dealing
7
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
8
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July: Follow Up’.
9
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
118