The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“went
further than he had hitherto in commenting that he now had a sense
of momentum
about the
future”.
100.
On 30 June,
Gen Petraeus was reported to have “accepted as likely .. that
a
bridging
arrangement will be adopted and that a final SOFA will not emerge
in 2008”.34
101.
Lt Gen Cooper
judged that Iraqi desire to assert sovereignty was increasing,
and
was having
a significant impact on the SOFA negotiations.
102.
General Sir
Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, visited Basra at the
end of
June, and
reported a “very positive mood within MND(SE) and a real sense that
we may
actually be
able to deliver success, although within a realistic
timeframe”.35
He
believed
it was
important to be “absolutely focused on delivering success – in
terms of the
objectives
that we have already set – rather than be too directed by any
understandable
desire for
early delivery”. However, he remained “unconvinced that the PRT in
Basra is
demonstrating
enough energy, purpose and drive to be able to deliver meaningful
results
in the
timeframe we require”.
103.
On 3 July,
Mr Day told the Iraq Strategy Group that negotiations between
the US
and Iraq on
legal arrangements for the presence of US forces were going
badly.36
The
SOFA was
now “on the back burner” and the US was pursuing an Interim
Protocol to
span the
gap between the end of the Security Council resolution and the
completion of
a SOFA.
104.
Mr Day
thought the most likely outcome was a six month rollover of the
Chapter VII
mandate
contained in the resolution. Mr McDonald said that solution
would be
acceptable
to the UK.
105.
The UK would
require an additional bilateral amendment, in light of its
obligations
under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Mr McDonald noted that
Mr Brown
had
previously stated that UK forces were in Iraq under a UN mandate
and at the
invitation
of the Iraqi Government; it would be necessary to continue that
cover
into 2009.
106.
Mr Day
told the Iraq Strategy Group that the MOD was developing a paper on
the
long term
UK military role in Iraq which would map the route to a normal
bilateral military
relationship.
107.
Mr Prentice
called on Ambassador Crocker on 4 July to discuss the SFA
and
SOFA.37
A minute of
the discussion written by British Embassy staff recorded
that
34
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 30 June 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (307) 30 Jun
08’.
35
Minute CGS
to PSO/CDS, 4 July 2008, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq and Cyprus – 30 Jun-2
Jul 08’.
36
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 7 July 2008, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 3 July’.
37
Email Brett
to Prentice, 6 July 2008, ‘Call on Ambassador Crocker, 4 July:
SFA/SOFA’.
398