3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
•
To be
successful in achieving the return of inspectors, any resolution
had to
coincide
with a credible military timetable to maximise the pressure on
Saddam.
•
There
should be no additional conditions for inspections.142
456.
The JIC
issued an Assessment of Iraq’s possession of chemical
and
biological
weapons and possible scenarios for their use on 9 September
2002.
457.
The
Assessment contained a number of significant changes
which
strengthened
previous JIC judgements on Iraq’s possession of chemical
and
biological
weapons and the likelihood of their use.
458.
In response to
the request from Sir David Manning for advice on the
possible
scenarios
for Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons, the JIC
commissioned an
459.
The Key
Judgements of the JIC Assessment, which was issued on 9
September,
were:
“•
Iraq has a
chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is
prepared
to use
it.
•
Faced with
the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from
power,
Saddam is
unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological
weapons
by any
diplomatic or military means.
•
The use of
chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack
would
boost
support for US‑led action and is unlikely.
•
Saddam is
prepared to order missile strikes against Israel, with chemical
or
biological
warheads, in order to widen the war once hostilities
begin.
•
Saddam
could order the use of CBW weapons in order to deny space
and
territory
to coalition forces, or to cause casualties, slow any advance, and
sap
US
morale.
•
If not
previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of
whatever
CBW weapons
remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final
act
of
vengeance. But such an order would depend on the availability of
delivery
means and
the willingness of commanders to obey.”144
460.
The
preparation of the Assessment, its detailed findings, and the
intelligence
underpinning
it are addressed in Section 4.2. That Section also addresses the
dossier,
142
Minute
[junior official] to HMA [UKMIS New York], 11 September 2002,
‘Iraq: Meeting with Levitte’.
143
Minutes, 4
September 2002, JIC meeting.
144
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons –
Possible Scenarios’.
171