3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
he realised
the limitations; more for the Security Council, as he saw that more
than
a few
days would be needed to find language that brought people
together.”
269.
Commenting on
the debate in London on ideas for the final stages of
diplomatic
activity,
Sir Jeremy advised that the Franco-German proposals for reinforced
inspections
would
be:
“…
recognised by the Security Council middle ground as a delaying
tactic and
unlikely to
make a difference on complete disarmament … But Council
members
remain very
reluctant to grant cover for military action within weeks …
The
Americans
may be upbeat about the likely effect of their lobbying and
cajoling.
But I
cannot say at this point that we would definitely get nine votes
for a material
breach
resolution on the basis of what seem to be the Blix/ElBaradei
intentions
for the
14 February report.
“Injecting
an ultimatum … might possibly help at the margins … though I
would
hesitate to
bank on it. If the ultimatum was directed at Saddam’s departure
…
that would
be a clearer criterion than offering up elements of WMD. But
the
Americans
are right that the Council majority are expressly opposed to the
idea
of regime change
…”
270.
Sir Jeremy
suggested consideration of “a more radical halfway-house
plan”:
“If the UK
has to be sure of recapturing the initiative, we may have to think
bolder.
We should
test the Franco-German model to destruction. A Chapter VII
resolution
authorising
all necessary means for the specific purpose of hunting down
hidden
WMD is
worth considering. The objective has to be to place enough
Coalition troops
on the
ground, with No-Fly and No-Drive Zones declared by the Security
Council
throughout
Iraq, for mobile WMD transports etc to be tracked down, revealed
and
destroyed.
Baghdad and other major cities would be left to one side, at least
for the
first
stage. There could be arrangements for interviews offering greater
protection
than the
present.”
271.
Sir Jeremy
thought that, when faced with the alternatives, Council members
would
“rally to
this approach”. But it might not “readily fit” the American
“military preferences”.
Sir Jeremy
wrote:
“… the most
important aspect … would be Saddam’s reaction. He would
bitterly
oppose a
UN-authorised take-over of parts of Iraq. If it were imposed on
him, he
might
quickly break the no-resistance conditions. In that case, the ‘last
resort’ would
have been
much more clearly established.”
272.
Sir Jeremy
concluded:
“This plan
does not have to be used immediately. We could go through the
stages
of
presenting and arguing for the second resolution of the kind we
have been
discussing,
before coming to a final decision. But the prospects of a 15-0
SCR
229