The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
632.
There is no
evidence which explains how President Bush was advised that
the
UK would
play a leading role in the North in the event of an invasion. The
most likely
routes
would have been the briefings from Gen Franks on 5 August or
the briefing of the
National
Security Council before Mr Blair’s arrival at Camp David on 7
September.
633.
The Inquiry
can only conclude that the US understanding was based on
military
discussions
over the summer; and that it would have reinforced the messages
that had
been
reported in the late spring of 2002.
634.
The JIC
issued an Assessment of Iraq’s possession of chemical
and
biological
weapons and possible scenarios for their use on 9
September.
635.
Following
Mr Blair’s meeting on 23 July, Sir David Manning asked
Mr Scarlett for
further
advice on Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities and intentions, in
particular in
relation to
the possible use of chemical and biological agents.256
636.
The JIC
Assessment was issued on 9 September.257
The Key
Judgements stated:
“•
Iraq has a
chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is
prepared
to use
it.
•
Faced with
the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from
power,
Saddam is
unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological
weapons
by any
diplomatic or military means.
•
The use of
chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack
would
boost
support for US‑led action and is unlikely.
•
Saddam is
prepared to order missile strikes against Israel, with chemical
or
biological
warheads, in order to widen the war once hostilities
begin.
•
Saddam
could order the use of CBW weapons in order to deny space
and
territory
to Coalition forces, or to cause casualties, slow any advance, and
sap
US
morale.
•
If not
previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of
whatever
CBW weapons
remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final
act
of
vengeance. But such an order would depend on the availability of
delivery
means and
the willingness of commanders to obey.”
637.
The Assessment
and the basis for its judgements are addressed in Section
4.2.
256
Minute
Manning to Blair, 24 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
257
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons – Possible
Scenarios’.
270