12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
He said
that in the six months following the incident “there had been
virtually no activity”
in police
stations, and many “had simply not been touched”.903
966.
On 12
September 2005, a week before the Jameat incident, Dr Reid
wrote to
Mr Blair
advising that “considerable progress” had been made in training the
ISF since
May.904
He
recommended that “consequently, an overall reduction of about 500
troops”
would be
possible in “October/November”.
967.
On 10 October,
Dr Reid announced in the House of Commons plans to
reduce
force
levels in MND(SE) by “about 500”.905
968.
In the
subsequent debate, Mr Michael Ancram asked Dr Reid about
the level of
infiltration
by “Iranian‑backed insurgents” in the police. Dr Reid
responded:
“In any
theatre of combat in the world where competing factions have been
at war
with each
other there is always a problem of split loyalties when
rehabilitating and
restructuring
the police force afterwards. The question is not whether those
split
loyalties
exist, but whether we can diminish them by human rights training
and
training
the police to be as objective as possible … However, although there
are
certain
elements in the police service in Iraq about who we ought to be
worried,
I would not
want him to believe that that is the majority or anything like it.
Let us
remember
that every time Iraqi policemen put on their uniforms in the
morning, they
go out to
face the threat of death. Many of them have died leading
operations. Even
in Basra,
there were police around the Jameat Police Station trying to ensure
that
the 250 to
300 militant demonstrators did not approach it. So it is not the
case that
all the
police, even in Basra, were antagonistic towards us.”
969.
Dr Reid
provided Mr Blair with a security update on 11
October.906
He
reported:
“Despite a
lack of an Iraqi lead from Baghdad, MND(SE) have continued to
build
bridges
with the local authorities post the Basra incident. Outside Basra
city, Security
Sector
Reform (SSR) work has continued with little interruption, including
joint
patrolling.
In Basra itself, our soldiers are again visiting IPS stations and
we are able
to talk in
private to the Chief of Police …
…
“Security
Sector Reform (SSR) continues to be MNF‑I’s main effort with
MND(SE)
focusing on
the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army … and the Department of
Border
903
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 19‑20.
904
Letter Reid
to Blair, 12 September 2005.
905
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
10 October
2005, columns 24, 28‑30.
906
Paper Reid,
11 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Security Update’.
277