6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
71.
On
8 April, following Mr Blair’s talks with President Bush at
Crawford, Texas (see
Section
3.2), Mr Hoon instructed the MOD to undertake work on “the
specific equipment
requirements
(UORs)” necessary to deliver the military options being considered
as part
of the
initial discussions about possible UK participation in military
action against Iraq.32
This was
because “equipment – rather than personnel – was likely to be on
the critical
path in
terms of deployment timelines”.
72.
Following
consultation with Sir Kevin Tebbit and Adm Boyce,
Mr Simon Webb, MOD
Policy
Director, sent Mr Hoon a think piece entitled ‘Bush and the
War on Terrorism’ on
12 April.33
Mr Webb’s
minute provided formal advice on the possible scale of any
UK
military
contribution and included a draft letter to
Mr Blair.
73.
Setting out
the MOD’s thinking on military issues, Mr Webb
wrote:
•
“The
fundamental building block for a major US ground force operation is
a
division.
Only on that scale (requiring 3 brigades as our planning base)
would
UK have
significant influence over how the operation was developed
and
conducted:
an independent brigade does not fit into the US structure and
would
in any case
need substantial divisional scale enablers in order to be safe for
high
intensity
operations …
•
“Such a
deployment would be at the extreme end of the UK’s capacity after
the
SDR: it was
the scenario against which the ‘large’ option was
scaled.”
•
The UK
“should seek only to make a respectable large contribution that we
can
sustain
properly …”
74.
On 9 May, Sir
Kevin Tebbit was sent the first assessment of equipment lead
times
for
potential operations in Iraq in response to his 3 April
request.34
The
assessment
noted that
a minimum of six months lead time was “necessary to fill essential
capability
gaps before
we could launch a Gulf War scale operation against Iraq”. It also
noted
that the
six months lead time was measured from “the point at which an
unambiguous
authorisation
to spend the necessary money is given”.
75.
The MOD’s
assessment identified several “showstopping” equipment
capability
deficiencies
with “the timelines for rectifying them”, including:
•
The desert
environment modifications to the Challenger 2 tank would take
six
months,
with a further three if air filtration was added.
•
Chemical
protection measures would require six months and
biological
protection
measures would require between nine and 12 months.
•
Aircraft
secure communications.
32
Minute
Watkins to PSO/CDS, 8 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.
33
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 April 2002, ‘Bush and the
War on Terrorism’.
34
Minute
Witney to PS/PUS [MOD], 9 May 2002, ‘Iraq – Equipment Lead
Times’.
13