The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

163.  Mr Blair listed nine points to be injected into the debate and told his staff “we need

a concerted effort, organised and disciplined, to get this across”.

164.  The points listed emphasised the presence of “foreign jihadists”, in Iraq since

before March 2003 but increasingly without the support of the Iraqi people. Mr Blair

described Iraq as part of a global counter-terrorism approach to protect the UK’s

security, although this was not the original intention behind the invasion. He rejected

the argument that Iraq increased the terrorist threat, highlighting that 9/11 and other

incidents took place before the war began.

165.  On 28 September, Mr Blair addressed the Labour Party conference in Brighton.76

On Iraq, he said:

“The evidence about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons,

as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be wrong.

“I acknowledge that and accept it.

“I simply point out, such evidence was agreed by the whole international community,

not least because Saddam had used such weapons against his own people and

neighbouring countries.

“And the problem is, I can apologise for the information that turned out to be wrong,

but I can’t, sincerely at least, apologise for removing Saddam.”

166.  Mr Blair told the conference: “The world is a better place with Saddam in prison not

in power.”

167.  In a video conference in early October, Mr Blair told President Bush that there had

been a debate at the Party Conference, which had been won by 4:1.77 He observed that:

“There had been a number of powerful Iraqi speakers.”

168.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald spoke to Dr Rice on 29 September.78 Sir Nigel set out his

impression that the tempo of planning and preparation was being increased ready for

an operation in Fallujah.

169.  Dr Rice confirmed that the ground was being prepared, but that no decisions had

been taken. Sir Nigel “accepted that pressure for action in Fallujah was growing” and

“made clear that we would need to return to this once plans had advanced”.

170.  On 30 September, the JIC circulated an Assessment of the Sunni Arab

Opposition.79 The Assessment gave an overview of the nature of the insurgency in the

76  BBC News, 28 September 2004, Full text of Blair’s speech.

77  Letter Phillipson to Adams, 5 October 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 5 October:

US elections, Iraq, Iran, MEPP’.

78  Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 29 September 2004, ‘Conversation with US National Security Adviser,

29 September’.

79  JIC Assessment, 30 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Sunni Arab Opposition’.

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