The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
UNSCOM
should consider what had been achieved in relation to
missiles
and
chemical weapons as sufficient to meet Iraq’s obligations in
section C of
resolution 687.
•
Iraq was
“ready to start serious and extensive work to address the
biological
file in
order to close it within a short time”. It had “completely
destroyed” all the
biological
agents in its possession and all “the sites, apparatuses and
equipment
used in the
production of biological agents”. All the 87 sites which
UNSCOM
considered
could be capable of dual use for the production of biological
agent
were “under
strict monitoring”.
•
Iraq was
“ready to continue to work with the Special Commission in a
serious,
scientific,
technical and objective manner” to close the files “so that the
Council
may proceed
to implement its obligations towards Iraq” under paragraph 22
of
resolution
687 (1991) (removal of the restrictions on trade in resolution
661).
•
The people
of Iraq could not “continue suffering this injustice”. Iraq had
“fulfilled
the
obligations imposed on it” and the Security Council should do the
same,
“starting
at the earliest date”. If the “imbalance” continued, the
“situation” would
become
“absolutely unacceptable”.139
338.
Dr Blix
submitted his final consolidated report as Director General of the
IAEA on
6 October,
which concluded that the IAEA investigation of Iraq’s nuclear
programme had
reached the
point of diminishing returns. The extent to which the remaining
uncertainty
was
acceptable was a political judgement.
339.
The Butler
Report stated that, after 1995, the JIC consistently assessed that,
“if
all United
Nations controls on Iraq’s nuclear activities were removed, Iraq
could possibly
develop a
nuclear device in around five years”.140
340.
Dr Blix’s
final consolidated report assessed that the IAEA had a
“technically
coherent
picture” which revealed a programme:
“… aimed at
the production of an arsenal of nuclear weapons, based on
implosion
technology,
which had involved:
–
Acquisition
of non-weapon-usable nuclear material through
indigenous
production
and through overt and covert foreign procurement.
–
Research
and development programmes into the full range of
uranium
enrichment
technologies culminating in the industrialisation of EMIS
[Electro
Magnetic
Isotope Separation] and the demonstration of a proven
prototype
gas
centrifuge.
139
UN Security
Council, 13 October 1997, ‘Letter dated 12 October 1997
from the Deputy Prime Minister
of Iraq
addressed to the President of the Security Council’
(S/1997/789).
140
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
45.
84