The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

impact on the public debate. Later, many of the assertions in Colin’s speech would

prove inaccurate. But at the time, his words reflected the considered judgement

of intelligence agencies at home and around the world.”21

84. In his memoir, Mr Annan wrote:

“… I was impressed with his delivery but I was most concerned about the substance.

He did not produce any evidence of the ‘smoking gun’ variety, despite effectively

claiming to possess such evidence. Worse, I was not alone in thinking that Powell

himself did not appear as though he entirely believed his own case.”22

85. Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that, in private discussions over lunch, Mr Annan

commented that the forthcoming visit to Baghdad by Dr Blix and Dr Mohamed ElBaradei,

Director General of the IAEA, could be used to tell Iraq that the Security Council

“unanimously insisted on much improved co‑operation”.23

86. Sir Jeremy reported that Dr Blix had said he was grateful for the information

provided by Secretary Powell, which he would study carefully. If there were things

hidden in Iraq, the inspectors would try to find them. He had welcomed the Council’s

wish to stay united and the message that Iraq must co-operate actively:

“This could not be a game of catch-as-catch-can. Co-operation had to be

spontaneous. UNMOVIC could do a lot with more resources and improved

equipment. But Iraq was a big country. What really counted was active

co-operation on the South Africa model.”

87. Dr ElBaradei had “echoed” most of what Dr Blix had said: “There were plenty of

things to be clarified by the Iraqis … Iraqi co-operation must improve in a dramatic way.”

88. Asked by Secretary Powell to explain his idea of reinforced inspections, Sir Jeremy

reported that Mr de Villepin stated he believed:

“… there was space between fully active co-operation and war for other options …

The Middle East was complex. A broader strategy was needed. Force had to be

the very last resort, and then only with the legitimacy of the UN. To win the peace

after the war, the involvement of the UN was essential. The inspection regime under

1441 allowed the Council this further possibility. Only if they [the inspectors] met

a deadlock would we need to come back to 1441. We could not afford to go to a

bloody, long, expensive war on the basis of impatience. Other states would draw the

conclusion that you needed nuclear weapons to avoid attack: compare North Korea.

Such crises had to be solved by the international community collectively.

21 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

22 Annan, K. Interventions: A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane, 2012.

23 Telegram 214 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 5 February

Security Council Lunch’.

194