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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
78.  Two main factors appear to have contributed to the failure to meet the demand for
Arabic speakers in Iraq:
the finite number of Arabic speakers in the FCO; and
the absence of a mechanism for redeploying Arabic speakers from other FCO
jobs at short notice.
79.  The Inquiry welcomes the steps taken by the FCO since 2010 to increase the
number of Arabic speaker positions at FCO posts in the Middle East and North Africa,
and Mr William Hague’s decision as Foreign Secretary to open a new FCO language
school in 2013 and to prioritise Arabic language training.
80.  The Inquiry fully endorses Mr Hague’s view that expertise in a foreign language
makes UK diplomats:
“... vastly more effective at communicating the viewpoint of the United Kingdom.
And it is vital to understanding the political mood in different countries and to
spotting trends or anticipating crises.”26
81.  There is little evidence, however, that the Government has considered how to
respond effectively to a sudden surge in demand for particular language skills, especially
where demand may be unforeseen.
Lessons
82.  The Inquiry recognises that, since 2003, significant changes have been made to
the UK’s strategic and operational approach to reconstruction and stabilisation. Some
of those changes, including the establishment of a deployable UK civilian stand-by
capability, are the direct result of lessons learned from serious shortcomings in the
deployment of civilian personnel in post-conflict Iraq.
83.  The lessons identified in this Section remain relevant to the UK’s evolving
approach to reconstruction and stabilisation.
84.  Other lessons relating to the strategic role of civilians in post-conflict reconstruction
and stabilisation operations, the relationship between civilian and military deployments,
and the impact of the UK’s civilian-led programmes in Iraq are addressed in
Section 10.4.
85.  The effectiveness of the UK civilian effort in post-conflict Iraq was compromised by
a range of factors, including the absence of effective cross-government co-ordination on
risk, duty of care and the terms and conditions applicable to personnel serving in Iraq.
26  Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Rt Hon William Hague MP [from GOV.UK],
19 September 2013, Foreign Secretary opens Foreign Office language school.
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