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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Asked about the limits of the forces deployed by the US and the consequential importance
of the UK’s role in protecting the US flank, Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry told the
Inquiry, “we were taking a risk, we knew we were taking a risk”.304
DSF1 told the Inquiry:
“The force levels were limited, there was no force that could be put out into the
Euphrates Valley because there was no force available. The force was capable of
knocking off, with the air and the land and the marine manoeuvre, it was [cap]able of
removing the Republican Guard and the force that was in place. It was not capable of
securing a country.” 305
The end of combat operations
459.  Mr Blair made a statement to the House of Commons on 14 April, reporting that
“less than four weeks” from the outset of the conflict “the regime of Saddam is gone,
the bulk of Iraq is under Coalition control and the vast majority of Iraqis are rejoicing
at Saddam’s departure”.306
460.  Mr Blair continued: “Whatever the problems following Saddam’s collapse – and
in the short term they are bound to be serious – let no-one be in any doubt: Iraq is a
better place without Saddam.” Mr Blair added: “British forces have performed in Iraq with
extraordinary skill, professionalism and compassion. We can be deeply proud of them.”
461.  Mr Blair gave the House of Commons the following assessment of the situation
in Iraq:
“The South of Iraq is now largely under British control. The West is secure, and
in the major town of al-Qa’im fighting is diminishing. In the North, Kurdish forces
have retired from Kirkuk and Mosul, leaving US forces in control. US forces are in
and around Tikrit. They are meeting some resistance. But in essence, all over Iraq,
Saddam’s forces have collapsed. Much of the remaining fighting, particularly in
Baghdad, is being carried out by irregular forces. In Baghdad itself, the Americans
are in control of most of the city but not yet all of it.
“As is obvious, the problem is now the disorder following the regime’s collapse.
Some disorder, frankly, is inevitable. It will happen in any situation where a brutal
police state that for 30 years has terrorised a population is suddenly destroyed.
Some looting, too, is directed at specific regime targets, including hospitals that were
dedicated for the use of the regime. But it is a serious situation and we need to work
urgently to bring it under control.”
462.  Mr Blair’s description of the next phase of activity in Iraq is set out in Section 9.1.
304  Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 42.
305  Private hearing, 2010, page 17.
306  House of Commons, Official Report, 14 April 2003, columns 615-617.
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