3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

• as soon as combat operations are over, full UK participation in the military and

civilian tasks, including taking responsibility for a sector and for humanitarian

and reconstruction work. We could also take the lead in the UN on securing the

… resolution to authorise the reconstruction effort and the UN role in it which the

US now agree is necessary.”

156. Mr Straw concluded:

“We will obviously need to discuss all this, but I thought it best to put it in your mind

as event[s] could move fast. And what I propose is a great deal better than the

alternatives. When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way,

he wanted you alive not dead!”

157. Mr Straw’s minute was not sent to Lord Goldsmith or to Mr Geoff Hoon, the

Defence Secretary.

158. Mr Straw’s Private Office replied separately on 11 March to a request from

Sir David Manning for advice on the implications of the argument that a French veto

would be unreasonable.46

159. The FCO advised that there was “no recognised concept of an ‘unreasonable

veto’”; and warned that: “In describing a French veto as ‘unreasonable’ we would

therefore be inviting others to describe any future vetoes as ‘unreasonable’ too.”

That could have implications in other areas “such as the Middle East”. In addition,

“describing the veto as unreasonable would make no difference to the legal position”.

There was “no implied condition” in the UN Charter that a veto was valid “only” if it was

reasonable. There was “already pressure at the UN to abolish veto rights”. And pressure

could be expected to increase “if the argument that certain vetoes were ‘unreasonable’ –

and could therefore be ignored – gained ground”.

160. The UK was “on record as saying that the veto should only be used with restraint

and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Charter”.

161. Ministers discussed legal issues, including holding the response to a US

request for the use of UK bases for a few days, on 11 March.

162. They also discussed the viability of the military plan.

163. Mr Blair held a meeting to discuss the military plan and legal issues with Mr John

Prescott (Deputy Prime Minister), Mr Hoon, Lord Goldsmith and Admiral Sir Michael

Boyce (Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)).47 Mr Straw attended part of the meeting.

46 Letter Owen to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Council: Use of Vetoes’.

47 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military: 1300 Meeting’.

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