6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
It was
“clear in [the] planning” that it was very important to secure the
northern
oilfields
to prevent Saddam causing a humanitarian and environmental
disaster
and to
preserve the resources for rebuilding Iraq.544
“So there
were very strong reasons for a force to … fix the North, and
strong
reasons
therefore, for the UK to regard that as an appropriate role for us
to
help with.”
1391.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that part of the practical problem was that the
Kuwaiti
border with
Iraq was “relatively short” and, unlike the conflict in 1991,
Coalition Forces
could not
cross the Saudi border. That meant “a lot of soldiers were being
funnelled
through a
relatively narrow area”. He had been concerned that those forces
would be
“highly
vulnerable” to chemical and biological weapons.545
1392.
The judgement
that southern Iraq was the most likely area for the first use
of
chemical or
biological weapons against Coalition Force, and against the local
population,
was
contained in the JIC Assessment of 19 February 2003, ‘Southern
Iraq: ‘What’s
1393.
Asked by the
Inquiry in May 2010 about the benefits of the northern option as
he
had
understood them, Sir Kevin replied they were:
•
the need to
“shut the door” to prevent Saddam Hussein retreating
north;
•
to “avoid
what would otherwise be a very politically difficult situation with
the
Kurds and
the Turks”;
•
squeezing
from both directions provided “a much better way of
outmanoeuvring
your
opponent”;
•
concerns
about “a real bottleneck through Kuwait”; and
•
the Kurdish
Autonomous Zone was a “fairly stable area”, which “looked
rather
easier than
fighting one’s way or helping to fight one’s way up
Iraq”.547
1394.
Sir Kevin
recognised that the mountainous terrain in south‑eastern
Turkey
and the
length of the logistics supply lines would have posed challenges,
but he
thought Adm Boyce
and “a lot of military men would have liked” to have had
the
1395.
Lt Gen Reith
expressed reservations about the relative advantages
and
disadvantages
of the northern option in November.
544
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 51‑53.
545
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 62.
546
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s In
Store?’.
547
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 13‑14.
548
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 14.
379