12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1258.
General Sir Nicholas
Houghton described Op SINBAD to the Inquiry as the
“last
best
operation” to provide:
“… sort of
exemplar modelling to the Iraqi Army but trying to put them in the
lead of
it. In the
latter stages of SINBAD, it became important that they were seen to
be in
1259.
Gen Houghton
described the “instantaneous” follow‑up “of police reform,
with
police
reform teams going into areas of Basra as they were cleared and
made more
stable by
Iraqi Army back‑filling”.
1260.
On 27 October,
Mr Banner wrote to Mr Siddiq, summarising a briefing
that
Mr Asquith
had given Mr Blair the previous day.1173
Mr Blair
had been told:
“The Iraqi
Army had performed well in some areas (e.g. 10th Division in
Basra).
But it
lacked maturity, had poor mechanism for civilian control and
direction, and
equipment
was unevenly distributed and sometimes inadequate to
task.”
1261.
Mr Blair
requested further advice on how to strengthen the Iraqi Army and
Prime
Minister
Maliki’s control of it. A copy of the note was sent to the MOD for
action.
1262.
The MOD
replied on 9 November.1174
With respect
to MND(SE), the MOD stated
that 10th
Division’s planned development was “on track” but that it
was:
“…
consistently placed at the bottom of the prioritisation list by
Baghdad due to the
perceived
low threat in Southern Iraq. As a result, they are potentially
outgunned by
insurgents
and remain vulnerable when moving by vehicle.”
1263.
The MOD wrote
that it was “scoping the possibility of gifting 250
armoured
protection
vehicles” to “enhance” 10th Division’s capacity. It stated that
Enhanced
Military
Training Teams (Super MiTTs) would “evolve” to “protect and enhance
the
progress
already made” when units were transferred to Iraqi control. Those
Super
MiTTs were
not described in any further detail.
1264.
Reflecting on
the Iraqi Army’s performance in his evidence to the
Inquiry,
Lt Gen Shirreff
said:
“[The Iraqi
Army] improved in terms of confidence, in terms of
training,
immeasurably,
I think, during the period of SINBAD, but they were not up to
holding
in security
terms, because, ultimately, however confident they got, you
have
to remember
that the Iraqi Army in south‑east Iraq were Shia‑recruited,
locally
1172
Public
hearing, 5 January 2010, page 20.
1173
Minute
Banner to Siddiq, 27 October 2006, ‘Iraq’.
1174
Letter
McNeil to Banner, 9 November 2006 attaching Minute DJC, 9 November
2006, ‘Strengthening
the Iraqi
Military Forces’.
347