4.4 | The
search for WMD
In July
2004, the Butler Report supported the FCO’s claim, concluding that
the report
appeared
“well-founded”: the “intelligence was credible” that Iraq had
sought to purchase
uranium ore
from Niger in 1999.207
The Iraq
Survey Group found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from abroad
after
1991. It
found only one offer of uranium to Baghdad after 1991, and that had
been turned
down
because of sanctions.208
402.
At the request
of the JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD, a Current
Intelligence
Group (CIG)
assessed the information on prohibited missile designs provided by
senior
figures in
the missile programme.209
403.
The Key
Judgements were:
“I.
Information that Iraq was pursuing a number of designs for
prohibited ballistic
missiles
between 2000 and 2002 is, despite some discrepancies,
credible.
“II. The
missiles were designed to reach ranges between 500-600km and
900-
1,000km.
Initial examination indicates that the designs produced and the
four to five
year
timeframe envisaged to reach full production appear technically
credible.
“III.
Senior figures in the ballistic missile programme were actively
engaged in
concealing
this design work from UNMOVIC, both physically and in interviews
with
inspectors.
The aim was to preserve the designs for future use.
“IV. Some
of the individuals are not being entirely forthcoming on sensitive
issues,
such as
chemical and biological warhead designs, possibl[y] out of fear of
the
consequences
for them.”
404.
The Assessment
stated that two consistent themes had emerged from the
interviews
that had been conducted so far:
“•
Iraq worked
on a number of missile designs between late 2000 and early
2002
… but no
missile hardware was produced;
•
Orders were
received in mid 2002 to conceal all signs of such design work
from
UN weapons
inspectors and these orders were carried out.”
207
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898.
208
Central
Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, The
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to
the DCI on
Iraq’s WMD, Volume II,
‘Nuclear’, pages 7-8.
209
CIG
Assessment, 16 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Prohibited Ballistic
Missile Designs’.
503