The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
246.
Mr Straw
commented that:
“… a change
in strategy was not a practical or realistic option. However, we
might
wish to
adjust our activities on the ground and design ways of responding
more
effectively
to evolving situations.”
247.
It was agreed
that a paper would be circulated by officials from the FCO, the
MOD
and DFID,
and sent to Mr Blair the following week.
248.
It was also
agreed that the FCO should pursue the possibility of
asking
Sir Ronnie Flanagan,
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary for
England,
Wales and
Northern Ireland, to provide an assessment of the IPS in MND(SE).
That is
addressed
in Section 12.1.
249.
The Jameat
incident had repercussions within the MNF, as Lt Gen Brims’
weekly
report on
25 September explained:
“I believe
we acted most skilfully in Basra in how we handled last week’s
events and
conducted
the operations correctly … My focus was … on the ‘Baghdad fall-out’
of
the events,
trying to assuage the concerns of General Casey and, together with
the
British
Ambassador, dealing with the initial criticism of the British
forces’ actions by
senior
figures in the Iraqi Transitional Government.
“General
Casey initially received erroneous information on 19 September …
that
the British
had stormed Basra police station and he believed MND(SE) was
acting
under the
direction of London rather than the coalition. He told me he had
arranged
for a plane
to take me [Brims] to Basra to take command of the British battle
space
… I gave
him accurate information, which did calm him somewhat …
Nevertheless,
there was a
period when relations with Gen Casey were the most strained I
have
experienced,
and I believe that the events of 19th September and a number
of
subsequent
occurrences (including some media handling) has left him with
a
residual
doubt about whether the UK element of MND(SE) is more under the
direct
operational
command of London/PJHQ than of MNC-I and the
coalition.”120
250.
Lt Gen Brims
told the Inquiry that this perception had put him in a “slightly
awkward
position”
and it had lingered for some time after the event.121
251.
The ITG had
also gained a negative impression of the UK’s actions in Basra
on
252.
Lt Gen Brims
emphasised that it was “vital” to prevent it souring the
relationship
and “making
it much more difficult for us – and the Coalition generally – to
operate”. At
the same
time, the ITG needed to be “confronted with the reality of
militia-led elements
120
Minute
Brims to CDS, 25 September 2005, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (180) 25
September 05’.
121
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, page 32.
122
Minute
Brims to CDS, 25 September 2005, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (180) 25
September 05’.
530