The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

no evidence provided of links with Al Qaida; he did not have the wherewithal to attack

the UK directly; and there had been “an awful lot of scaremongering”. The Government’s

“impatience” would “reap a whirlwind”.330

932. In his speech, Mr Kennedy stated that he did “not believe that the case for war”

had been established, but he acknowledged that the Government deserved credit for

persuading a “reluctant” US “to go down the UN route” and for emphasising the primary

need for a “meaningful” MEPP.331 He also drew attention to Mr Annan’s remarks the

previous day, expressing concern about the legitimacy of action without the support

of the Security Council.

933. Mr Kennedy concluded by drawing attention to the number of people who had

expressed concern about the “doctrine of regime change”, were “wary of the motives”

of the US Administration, and “did not like to see Britain separated from its natural

international allies”.

934. More than fifty backbench MPs spoke in the debate, offering a wide range of

views about the prospect of military action.

935. In his speech closing the debate, Mr Straw drew attention to the importance of

a just and lasting settlement of the dispute between Israel and Palestine, which was,

“as important for the future stability of the region as the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction”.332

936. In relation to Iraq, Mr Straw drew attention to the recommendations of the Select

Committee on International Development, including the need for a new UN Security

Council resolution “to provide proper authority for reconstruction and redevelopment

work, and, in addition, a proper mandate for any Government who are to operate within

the territory of Iraq once Saddam Hussein is removed”.

937. Mr Straw stated that the House of Commons had never before had the

opportunity to vote on a substantive motion for its explicit support for the use of the

Armed Forces. That placed “a heavy responsibility” on each member of the House.

938. Mr Straw added that the choice was “not easy”. He had “worked for months

for a peaceful resolution of the crisis”, and he was as certain as he could be “that the

Government’s course of action was right”.

939. Mr Straw also stated:

• “… no one, either today or in New York in the four Security Council meetings

that I attended, has … claim[ed] that Saddam Hussein has fulfilled the full and