The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
374.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the progress of the campaign on 4
April,
including
the signal sent to the Shia in Baghdad as a result of the Royal
Marines’
exemplary
conduct in Basra. Iraqi forces in Basra could collapse but it was
“more likely”
that there
would be “patient erosion so that the city fell in 10 days or two
weeks”.199
Mr Blair
pointed out the need to convince the Iraqi population that the
regime was
“crumbling”
and that “we [the Coalition] were not going to leave”.
375.
The discussion
of Phase IV issues is addressed in Sections 9.1 and
10.1.
376.
In a letter
to the Iraqi people on 4 April, Mr Blair stated that Saddam
Hussein
would go
and that troops would not remain in Iraq “a day longer than
necessary”.
377.
On 4 April,
the text of a letter from Mr Blair to the people of Iraq,
which was being
distributed
by UK troops in Iraq, was reported in the media.200
In the
letter Mr Blair
assured
readers that Saddam Hussein would be “gone”, and went on to make
the
following
commitments:
“Our troops
will leave as soon as they can. They will not stay a day longer
than
necessary.
“We will
make sure deliveries of vital aid such as food, medicine and
drinking water
get
through.
“Our aim is
to move as soon as possible to an interim authority run by
Iraqis.
This will
pave the way for a truly representative Iraqi government, which
respects
human
rights and the rule of law; develops public services; and spends
Iraq’s wealth
not on
palaces and weapons of mass destruction, but on schools and
hospitals.”
378.
Mr Scarlett
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 5 April that the
Republican
Guard had
suffered comprehensive defeat outside Baghdad, and that the loss of
the
airport
appeared to have had a shock effect on the
militias.201
There was
uncertainty
about the
militias’ ability to reconstitute the defence of the city. The
Republican Guard
had
evacuated positions in the North. With the disablement of
communications and
therefore
control, the general sense was that the Iraqi regime was
collapsing.
379.
Adm Boyce
stated that a heavy armoured US unit had entered Baghdad
to
demonstrate
to the population that the regime had lost control. The question
for Coalition
commanders
was whether to maintain the momentum and take Baghdad, or
consolidate
and
establish a cordon round the city. In the North, the Regular Army
had been badly
damaged by
air attack and might be prepared to capitulate. In the South, the
British
199
Letter
No.10 [junior official] to McDonald, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime
Minister’s Video Conference
with President
Bush.
200
CNN, 4
April 2003, Full text:
Blair’s open letter to Iraq.
201
Minutes, 5
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
64